BEFORE THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION APPEALS BOARD UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C.


Washington,<br>D.C.

Wednesday, October 17, 2007

The above-entitled matter came on
for ORAL ARGUMENT at approximately 10:00 a.m.
at the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA

East Building, 1201 Constitution Avenue, NW,
Washington, D.C.

BEFORE:

HONORABLE EDWARD E. REICH
HONORABLE ANNA L. WOLGAST
HONORABLE KATHIE A. STEIN

APPEARANCES:
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ALSO PRESENT:
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3

## PROCEEDINGS

CLERK: All rise. This hearing is now in session for oral argument, in re: Christian County Generation, Permit No. 021060ABC, PSD Appeal No. 07-01.

The Honorable Judges, Anna Wolgast, Ed Reich, Kathie Stein, presiding.

Please be seated.
JUDGE REICH: Good morning. We're hearing a oral argument this morning in the matter of Christian County Generation, a PSD permit appeal, pursuant to the Board's order of September 25, 2007, as amended on October 15,2007 , and we'll proceed as follows:

Sierra Club has been allocated 40 minutes for its argument, and it may reserve up to 10 minutes of that time for rebuttal.

Christian County Generation is allocated 30 minutes, and EPA's Office of Air and Radiation, as represented by EPA's Office of General Counsel, and appearing at the

Board's request, will have 20 minutes for its argument.

Then Sierra Club may use its reserve time, if any, for rebuttal.

Regrettably, the Board was notified by fax from Robb Layman, Assistant Counsel, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency on October 12th, that the Illinois EPA would not be able to participate in this argument due to unresolved issues of legal representation between the Illinois EPA and the Illinois Attorney General's Office.

In response to this development, the time allocated to Christian County Generation, which is aligned with the Illinois EPA, although their arguments may not be identical in all respects, was increased to 30 minutes as previously noted.

Let me also note primarily that the Board understands that IEPA, as well as Christian County Generation, have argued that the issues and arguments raised in the Sierra

Club petition were not preserved for review. Sierra Club, not surprisingly, disputes that assertion. I'd like to emphasize the fact that the Board that is hearing the argument on these issues does not reflect any determination either way as to whether the issues and arguments were preserved and are thus properly before the Board.

Indeed, I expect the question of whether the issues and arguments were preserved will likely be part of the argument we have this morning. I would note further that since the scheduling of this argument, Sierra Club filed on October 9 a reply brief, which the Board accepted by order of October 16.

As part of this reply brief, Sierra Club withdrew its collateral impacts analysis claim. Thus, that issue is no longer before the Board and will form no part of this morning's argument.

Finally, I would note that on

October 15, Christian County Generation filed a letter requesting permission to discuss three documents during this argument. In the same order accepting the petitioner's reply brief, the Board granted Christian County Generation's request in part, and denied it in part.

Without a lot of preamble, I would like to begin by asking counsel to state their names for the record and whom they represent, in the order in which they will be arguing, beginning with Sierra Club.

MR. NILLES: Good moming. Bruce Nilles on behalf of the Sierra Club.

JUDGE REICH: Thank you, Mr. Nilles. CCG.

MR. RUSSELL: Good morning. Jim Russell, Christian County Generation.

MR. DOSTER: Good morning. Brian Doster, EPA Office of General Counsel, Air and Radiation Law Office, on behalf of the Office of Air and Radiation.

JUDGE REICH: Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Nilles, you can proceed, and please, let us know upfront if you're reserving time for rebuttal.

MR. NILLES: Thank you. Good moming. Again, Bruce Nilles, on behalf of petitioner Sierra Club, and at the outset, I would like to reserve 10 minutes for rebuttal, if that would be okay.

JUDGE REICH: Okay, fine.
MR. NILLES: What I'd like to do this morning is give a quick overview of the context of this case, and then tum quickly to the two central legal issues in this matter.

First of all, as the Court
indicated, did Sierra Club waive the right to raise the question of carbon dioxide BACT limit in this proceeding?

Secondly, does the word
"regulation" in the term subject to regulation in Section 165 have its ordinary
meaning and encompass the acid rain Title IV regulations, or does it have an alternate meaning.

Looking at this project, Christian
County is proposing to build a large power plant with the primary fuel of Illinois coal. Without any carbon dioxide controls, that plant will emit, if constructed as proposed, about 4 million tons of carbon dioxide a year. That's the equivalent of about 700,000 new cars in Illinois every year for the next 50 years.

And unlike cars which may last 7 to 10 years on average, this coal plant, of course, will last for about 50 years based on the experience of other similar power plants.

That's abut 200 million tons of carbon dioxide over the next 50 years. And it's not being permitted in a vacuum. According to the October 2007 report from the Department of Energy, there are approximately 90 new coal-fired power plants, or power
plants using coal proposed in the United
States currently either in the permitting process today or right behind in the planning and application process.

The consequence if we build all these power plants -- and not a single one of them is proposing at this point to do anything about its carbon dioxide emissions -- it would be an enormous increase in carbon dioxide at a time when we are wrestling with how do we solve the challenge of global warming.

As we lay out on our reply brief, there are some very simple things that can be done to a power plant to minimize its carbon dioxide emissions, increase the efficiency; use of clean fuels, particularly including biomass, combined heat and power, co-locating this power plant with another industrial process, such as an ethanol plant dramatically increases the efficiency and minimizes the carbon emissions, and lastly,
as the EPA itself has noted in recent comments on a draft environmental impact statement, carbon capture and storage may offer -- help with about up to 90 percent carbon control.

Now, all these power plants are moving through the permitting process, including Christian County. If we wait until they're built and then try to come back and retrofit them and do something about carbon, it can be either infeasible or extraordinarily expensive. The power plant's not located in the right place to be co-located with an industrial process so that we can use combined heat and power -- it simply won't happen.

It's not designed to use alternative fuels, cleaner fuels, including co-firing with biomass, and it may be for all intents and purposes impossible to come back and solve that problem later.

So from the public policy
perspective, addressing this problem upfront makes an enormous amount of sense and should be done in this case.

Turning to the legal issues, which of course are more important for today's review -- turning to the issue of waiver.

Respondents argue that Sierra Club did not raise the issue of carbon dioxide BACT emission limits during the public comment period.

As a technical matter, that is correct. However, the Board's rules and this case is -- do not hold that all issues have to be unequivocally raised in all proceedings. The test this Board has laid out both in the rules and in its case law is that only issues that were reasonably ascertainable -- and there may be good cause in some limited circumstances to not raise an issue.

Sierra Club did raise the --
JUDGE REICH: That's interesting,
because I think that's the first time that I remember you mentioning good cause in addition to not being reasonably ascertainable. Are you saying that you have an independent good cause argument, and have you made that before?

MR. NILLES: The reply brief lays out the reasonably ascertainable --

JUDGE REICH: All right.
MR. NILLES: Within that mbric, we would argue there is that good cause --

JUDGE REICH: Uh-huh.
MR. NILLES: Opportunity in the very narrow circumstances with the facts presented as they are here today.

JUDGE REICH: Uh-huh.
MR. NILLES: It is not as if Sierra
Club didn't raise this issue. We were intimately involved in this permit process.

On January 11, 2007, during the public comment period at the Taylorville High School, Sierra Club volunteer staff attended,
raised questions and testified we have to do something about global warming, there are ways to minimize global warming, the Agency should raise -- should address this issue, and -- in this permit proceeding.

In the public comments that were filed a month later in February -- 17 pages of single-spaced comments, half of those comments talk about the science of global warming and identify four specific ways the Agency could address carbon dioxide emissions, including consideration under the Endangered Species Act, setting regulations for carbon dioxide on its own consideration on the collateral impacts and under 165(a)(2), under the Alternatives Analysis.

JUDGE REICH: At the time you were providing these comments, what was the status of the case before the Supreme Court -- the Massachusetts case? Was it already before them and had it been argued?

MR. NLLLES: I believe it had been
argued.
JUDGE REICH: You believe it had. So at that point, basically you and everybody else was in a posture of waiting for a decision on the case that had been argued?

MR. NILLES: That is correct.
JUDGE REICH: Recognizing that the
Supreme Court took that case -- recognizing that you were still waiting for a decision, did you not recognize that there was a possibility that the Supreme Court was going to rule in favor of the arguments you made?

MR. NILLES: That was obviously a possibility and an outcome we were hoping for, which is why we argued it.

JUDGE REICH: So this is not a circumstance -- and I can envision conceivably that these circumstances, but this is not a circumstance where the legal picture changed because there was some decision by a court that really nobody was anticipating and established a wholly
different test or something else.
This is what it seems to me, basically an issue to which -- assuming I reach the merits, there were only two issues, yes or no on the question whether it's a pollutant, and had some confidence that there was a possibility that they would understand, as they indeed said, yes, it's a pollutant,
and yet you didn't even think that it was worth making the argument, if not only to avoid this -- the issue of preservation that we're dealing with right now?

MR. NILLES: In January and February of 2007, we were dealing with the legal framework that was before us in Illinois, and even today, Iltinois EPA argues that Massachusetts EPA does have no bearing on this case. So the situation we were dealing with in January and February was a framework under which Illinois EPA had in prior permitting proceedings said we have no authority to address carbon dioxide under any
circumstance.
EPA had taken position it was not a pollutant, and the only court that had reviewed this issue to date, the D.C. Circuit, hadn't even found that there was standing for Petitioners to raise this.

JUDGE REICH: On the subject to regulation issue, Illinois now is controlled by the federal regs, not the EPA regulations. To the extent that you have this argument about acid rain, you wouldn't have had that irrespective of what Illinois thought about its own regulations.

MR. NILLES: But we still have to overcome the hurdle of is it a pollutant.

JUDGE REICH: Right. And that issue was -- clearly an open issue pending a decision. I mean, you knew where the Agency was coming from, but you knew that there was going to be a decision and there was a significant possibility that that decision was going to come down in a way that supported your position, and yet you still didn't think it worthwhile to make that argument?

I mean, I can't -- I find it
difficult to think you only make arguments that you know that the person you're making them to agree with. You know, at times you must make arguments knowing they may not agree with it, but it sets the pattern for a further appeal or other developments.

It's just -- as I said, I can see circumstances where something comes out of left field. This one seems like it was a very focused issue that was one that was not resolved because, notwithstanding the position of the Agency, the Supreme Court had taken the case and the Supreme Court was going to issue a decision on it.

And I think that's a context that you need to consider when dealing with reasonably ascertainable.

MR. NILLES: Again, Your Honor, the
comments and the testimony that was filed in this proceeding was using the framework, and it was the legal framework that was in place back in the early part of this year.

IEPA still didn't agree with the comments we made, but at least it was in the framework that they had laid out for the years before, and that was the framework within which we're operating. And also the significance of the Supreme Court ruling; it was one of the most sweeping, emphatic decisions about carbon dioxide and global warming -- very serious issues, the Agency cannot ignore it. And the emphatic language it uses to establish standing for the State of Massachusetts swept away the whole framework that had been in place prior to April 2, 2007.

JUDGE REICH: Can I see it, because I didn't anything in the record that after the Massachusetts decision but before the permit was issued, you never contacted

Illinois and asked them to reopen the comment period, or reconsider the draft permit in light of the Massachusetts decision? I'm not saying you have a legal obligation to do that, but I do want to confirm that there's nothing there that is in the record that suggests that you did that.

MR. NILLES: That is correct, Your Honor. We were not aware of any procedure in the Court's rules or 124 or otherwise for us to do that. That is correct.

JUDGE REICH: Well, definitely, the permit wasn't yet issues, so it really --

MR. NILLES: Okay.
JUDGE WOLGAST: Do you agree that it's your burden to show that this issue could not have been reasonably ascertained?

MR. NLLLES: We believe it's a legal matter. It's the Agency's obligation to establish BACT for CO 2 , regardless of what we do. And then in the question of should we have raised it, I think it's fair to say that
this office -- these are unique
circumstances, are very narrow circumstance with -- the exception would apply, and at the end of the day, I'm not sure if the Board has ever determined whose burden that would be.

Given the facts in this case, it would seem that given that Sierra Club had raised the issue of CO 2 , the decision came down, there is a good argument to be made that it was on the permitting agency to reopen the permit at that point, and to consider the fact that the landscape had changed. So I guess, in conclusion, the burden would be on -- I'm not sure there would be a burden if this is a strict legal question.

JUDGE STEIN: Mr. Nilles, you mentioned that this was a narrow circumstance. And assuming we were to agree with you if this issue was not reasonably ascertainable, I am interested in understanding what that would mean as a 21
practical matter. Does that mean that every time an appellate court or a court reverses a lower court on a legal issue, that the permit proceeding gets reopened? I mean, I was hoping you could help explain to me how broad or how narrow a ruling that would be?

MR. NILLES: The facts in this case are that the legal framework changed between the close of the comment period and the issuance of the permit.

JUDGE REICH: Doesn't that depend on how you define a legal framework? I mean, the act was the same. Nothing changed. I'm sure in your view the world was the same other than the fact that the Supreme Court told the Agency its interpretation was wrong. But I mean, there was not intervening change in the law --

MR. NILLES: That's correct.
JUDGE REICH: Other than correcting a misunderstanding that EPA apparently had.

MR. NILLES: That's correct. But

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| :---: | :--- |
| 1 | in this case, the permit wasn't final. So to |
| 2 | answer your question specifically, we are |
| 3 | arguing today that the narrow issue is that |
| 4 | the permit is not yet final, as it was not in |
| 5 | this case, because the Agency hadn't issued |
| 6 | the final permit. Under those circumstances, |
| 7 | if there is a change in the legal framework |
| 8 | such as a Supreme Court putting aside the |
| 9 | prevailing agency position about the |
| 10 | controlling law, under those facts, that's |
| 11 | the narrow exception that we're referring to |
| 12 | today. |
| 13 | JUDGE REICH: In terms of not |
| 14 | contacting the state after the Massachusetts |
| 15 | decision, did your thought to the fact that, |
| 16 | as you seem to recognize in your reply brief, |
| 17 | that the arguments that you had actually made |
| 18 | them in that proceeding to date were are all |
| 19 | based on the assumption that it was an |
| 20 | unregulated pollutant, and therefore it |
| 21 | wasn't just a question of where are we |
| 22 | looking at. |
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It was a question of the fact that while you had argued to that point, it no longer seemed to be a correct interpretation of the law. Did you not think about the fact that they were reacting at that point to comments that really no longer reflected your position of what the law was?

MR. NILLES: Again, there's -- the Agency, if the onus was on anyone to reopen because of the change in the legal framework, it would be on the Agency. I'm not aware of any procedures for us to, after the public comment process is closed, but before the issue, before the permit is closed -- before the permit is issued, to petition the Agency or do something at that point.

JUDGE REICH: Okay.
JUDGE STEIN: How many permits under your theory of what is reasonably ascertainable, in that whenever there is a change in the law, that all of these proceedings need to be opened -- do you have
any idea how many permits potentially are affected by your view of what constitutes reasonably ascertainable? And I realize this question may perhaps be more appropriately directed to the Agency. But given that you comment frequently on these coal-fired power plants, how many permits are we talking about?

MR. NILLES: In that narrow window between the close of the comment period and the issuance of the final permit, I'm not aware of any other proceeding I can think of where some legal framework of this magnitude was changed in the intervening period. So I'm not aware of, for example -- so, I'm not -- the answer is zero.

JUDGE STEIN: I am troubled by the breadth of the notion that you describe, in the sense that these permit proceedings are lengthy proceedings, sometimes taking years. And then suddenly there's a court decision where you're not merely looking at a
brand-new test that wasn't anticipated, you're looking at a change in position. And now we are suddenly talking about going back to square one on potentially a host of permits for the construction that are pending around the country.

And I'm not arguing for the environmental ramifications that you're pointing out, but from a practical perspective, I think that it's not an insignificant consideration.

MR. NILLES: Again, Your Honor, we are not -- the permits that are still in the public comment process today, we are raising this issue. So there is no ambiguity on those. What we are dealing with is that very narrow window where something as significant as a Supreme Court ruling happens between the close of the comment period and the issuance of the permit. So that's a very, very narrow slice of time. It's not years; it's literally weeks or potentially a couple of

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| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | three months. And that's what we are dealing | 1 pipeline that are going to have to address |
| 2 | with. And again -- | 2 what do we do about CO 2 . And the sooner we |
| 3 | JUDGE STEIN: Any change in the law | 3 get some resolution of this, obviously, the |
| 4 | classifies under your view of what's | 4 greater clarity for all the parties involved, |
| 5 | reasonably ascertainable? | both the regulatees and the regulators. |
| 6 | MR. NILLES: That's not what we're | Tuming to the question of whether |
| 7 | arguing, Your Honor. What we're dealing | 7 carbon dioxide is a pollutant subject to |
| 8 | with -- we can imagine there's something that | 8 regulation. The statutory framework in this |
| 9 | may be insignificant, but here we're dealing | 9 case is very simple. In 1977, Congress |
| 10 | with a fundamental question about the largest | 10 amended the Clean Air Act to add the PSD |
| 11 | pollutant being emitted from the source, the | 11 program, and used the language BACT is |
| 12 | legal status, legal framework, for how that | 12 required for any pollutant "subject to |
| 13 | pollutant is regulated was changed in that | 13 regulation." And to ensure that it was clear |
| 14 | intervening period between -- | 14 as to what it was meaning, at Section 169, |
| 15 | JUDGE STEIN: It was determined to | 15 the definition of BACT again uses that very |
| 16 | be a pollutant. | 16 same language, "subject to regulation." |
| 17 | MR. NILLES: Correct. | 17 Thirteen years later, 1990, |
| 18 | JUDGE STEIN: But you mentioned you | 18 Congress again amended the Clean Air Act, and |
|  | were going to talk about why in fact that | 19 in that case specifically ordered EPA to |
|  | translated since it being a regulated | 20 adopt regulations under Title IV of the Acid |
|  | pollutant. So I'd be interested in hearing | 21 Rain laws requiring monitoring, |
|  | your arguments on that point. | 22 recordkeeping, and reporting of carbon |
|  | 27 | 29 |
| 1 | MR. NILLES: Okay. | dioxide emissions from power plants. |
| 2 | JUDGE REICH: Okay. Let me just | If it intended to exclude carbon |
| 3 | make sure that we're prepared to move on to | 3 dioxide from the PSD definition, Congress |
|  | the substance of the issue. Okay. Why don't | 4 obviously knew explicitly how to do that. In |
| 5 | we address the substance of the issue. | 5 1991, when it added carbon dioxide |
| 6 | MR. NILLES: Right before we leave | 6 requirements, it also added a whole suite of |
| 7 | that, obviously, we're asking the Court to | 7 requirements under the Hazardous Air |
| 8 | remand this permit. But as the Court noticed | Pollutant Section 112 requirements, and |
| 9 | in its opening comments, there is another | 9 explicitly excluded Section 112 pollutants |
| 10 | permit proceeding right behind this involving | 10 from the PSD program. It did not do so for |
|  | Deseret, and I believe also a ConocoPhillips | 11 carbon dioxide. |
| 12 | PSD permit appeal raising this very same | 12 JUDGE REICH: There is a |
| 13 | issue. | 13 distinction -- you may not see it as a |
| 14 | And so I would urge, if this Court | 14 legally significant distinction, but there is |
| 15 | is weighing whether or not to address this | 15 a distinction between pollutants subject to |
| 16 | question, and the waiver issue is | 16 Hazardous Air Pollutant regulations which |
| 17 | recognized -- and the issue is coming at some | 17 clearly do establish emission limitations for |
| 18 | point very shortly -- again from a policy | 18 those pollutants, and acid rain CO 2 |
| 19 | perspective, it's not only in PSD-delegated | 19 requirement, which is a monitoring |
|  | states where Agency is the permitting Agency | 20 requirement? |
| 21 | wrestling with this issue, there are 90 | 21 MR. NILLES: Your Honor, you used |
| 22 | permit proceedings out there in the permit | 22 the exact term that the Congress used in the |

statute when it intended to mean actual control. Emission standard and limitation has a very specific meaning, and it's the meaning that EPA put forward as to what regulation means.

JUDGE REICH: I understand that argument. I'm suggesting that CO 2 may not have been viewed in parallel with hazardous air pollutants when they were dealing with our regulation.

MR. NILLES: We would point out that, or offer that, when Congress used the word "regulation," there is no indication that it meant to mean anything other than the generic usual commonsense notion of regulation. It used it in 1977, it used in 1990. And there was no indication at all that Congress meant to prescribe or narrow the definition of regulation of 1990 , and exclude monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements.

Illinois EPA in their brief tries
to make the argument that somehow those regulations are diminutive regulations. And of course, if we look at the history of environmental protection, reporting requirements, monitoring requirements, are some of the most successful regulations we have had in the United States over the last 30 years, toxic release inventory being the best example. And again --

JUDGE REICH: Let me ask about the 2002 Rhein Act (?) which is discussed in your reply brief. You cite to language that lists certain pollutants and indicate that because that's prefaced by "such as," that indicates that it's not an exhaustive list, and we should look at it that way. And by that I see you're looking at the language at the bottom of 80239 -- it's the language quoted in your brief.

I'll give you a chance to pull that out.

MR. NILLES: Okay.

JUDGE REICH: Do you have it? Okay, but what I'm curious about is, when you proceed to 80240 , where the Agency says the following pollutants currently regulated under the Act are subject to federal PSD review, there's a listing of pollutants that does not include CO 2 . And I don't see any language here comparable to the "such as" language that suggests that this is anything other than a complete list. And I'm wondering how you reconcile that.

MR. NILLES: Your Honor, the bigger issue in the 2002 regulations is, when EPA issued those final regulations, it was taking what had been proposed back in 1996 and very explicitly identified it wasn't addressing all the 1996 rulemaking issues, it was limiting it exclusively to five specific issues that it was going to be adopting in 2002.

There is no mention of carbon dioxide. There is no discussion about
narrowing the definition of "regulated pollutant" to exclude carbon dioxide. And it's sort of an implicit argument that somehow this preamble, because it doesn't takk about CO 2 , meant to explain the Agency making a dramatic change in the framework, and excluding carbon dioxide.

JUDGE REICH: So the issue is -- so you think the five issues you referenced discussed every one of the pollutants that are listed on this list?

MR. NILLES: It did not, Your Honor. It was changing the PSD program, and there was no indication that they were changing the definition of regulated pollutant into --

JUDGE REICH: But I mean, if they had a list and it listed pollutants that weren't relevant for the purposes of the five issues you talked about, then why would it not have listed CO 2 as well?

MR. NILLES: Your Honor, it's not
clear why they didn't list CO 2. But if we look at the actual regulation that was adopted in 2002 and the definition of "NSR regulated pollutant," the fourth category is -- and there is a statutory language, "any other pollutant otherwise subject to regulation." It is a very broad definition.

When the Agency intended to restrict the definition of regulated pollutant, it did so in Title V. The definition of "regulated air pollutant" in Title V doesn't include this broad statutory language from the PSD program otherwise subject to regulation.

JUDGE STEIN: How do you address the argument that I believe was made in the briefs by IEPA that when you look at this "any other pollutant" language, you need to look at it in light of the three provisions that precede it, which are much narrower and much more specific? How do you respond to that argument?

MR. NILLES: We mention in our reply brief that when the Agency is simply parroting the language of the statute, Supreme Court in the Gonzales case, said look to the statute. Unless the Agency is explicitly doing something different in its regulations, which it did not do in 2002 , it again adopted the specific language from the Act that had been in place since 1977. We should look to what the definition of that statutory act is.

That takes to Alabama Power, which back in 1980, was presented with the very question of what does "subject to regulation" mean. Industry was arguing, it doesn't mean any pollutant that's regulated.

JUDGE REICH: I have a question on that because that's interesting. In this Christian County Generation brief, they also refer to Alabama Power for the proposition that "subject to regulation" means already regulated. And you note in page 12 of your
reply brief, that point -- and you say the permittee cites the Alabama Power for the proposition that PSD applies to pollutants "already regulated."
"Because carbon dioxide is already regulated under the Act's Section 821 regulations, Sierra Club agrees with the permitting on this point." I want to make sure I understand that. Are you agreeing that the universe of "pollutants subject to PSD" are those that are already regulated for some purpose?

MR. NILLES: For today's proceeding, that's our argument, yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE REICH: Does that mean you are effectively withdrawing your argument that "subject to regulation" also includes pollutants that are not yet regulated but that the Agency may have a legal ability to regulate?

MR. NILLES: That's correct. For
today's proceeding, it is that category of pollutants which are regulated as of the date of the permit being issued.

JUDGE REICH: Because when you say today's proceeding, I am assuming that that effectively means you are abandoning that argument, and your argument is now limited to arguing that CO 2 is already regulated, either because of the acid rain monitoring requirement or the Illinois SIP.

MR. NILLES: That's correct.
JUDGE REICH: Is that a proper interpretation?

MR. NILLES: That is, Your Honor. JUDGE REICH: Okay.
MR. NILLES: Just to note, the Alabama Power case, when presented with the question of what is the scope of subject to regulation mean, determined that -- or stated that the EPA regulation, the one issued in 1978, applies immediately to "each type of pollutant regulated for any purpose under any
provision of the Act." It could not have been more clear.

And the Court goes on to note that there is no ambiguity in the statutory language. Again, the one quote that is -- has really looked to this question back when the PSD regulations were first adopted, unequivocally states that if it is regulated, it is subject -- if it is regulated anywhere in the Act, it is regulated for purposes of PSD.

JUDGE REICH: Before we proceed, can I ask you a question about your argument that's based on the Illinois SIP. And it is a little awkward not having Illinois here to address this, but you basically made an argument, as I recall, about the Illinois SIP in your comments, although in that context it was not that the Illinois SIP provision made this subject to review. It is more whether they had the authority to issue a permit given that provision of the Illinois SIP.

And the Agency did respond to that. You indicate that -- they haven't given a reasoned explanation. But as I remember the response to comments, they basically talk about that provision at some length. They indicate that it is more properly characterized as a statutory prohibition; in essence, a nuisance provision subject to direct enforcement. They don't see it as a regulation.

Given the deference that we normally afford to states in interpreting their own laws, why shouldn't we accept that as a definitive interpretation of the Illinois law?

MR. NILLES: The provision of the Clean Air Act that we're dealing with, "subject to regulation," and the key word obviously being regulation, picks up the Illinois SIP provision because the Illinois SIP provision is a regulation. It was a regulation proposed by the Agency to U.S.

EPA. EPA went though notes and comments before making it incorporated into the SIP. It is therefore by definition a regulation.

JUDGE REICH: So basically, anything that is in the form of a regulation qualifies?

MR. NILLES: That is in the regulation and that covers the pollutant at issue. Correct.

JUDGE WOLQAST: Its seems again, going back to a sort of an issue of a statutory regulatory interpretation, that whatever chemicals are covered as a BACT pollutant, as an NSR pollutant for purposes of BACT, is cabined by the "subject to" regulation that we're talking about now. But also that it appears in -- at significant levels. Could you speak to that, and how you arrive at the conclusion that a significant level should be anything greater than zero?

MR. NILLES: The EPA definition of the significance in the PSD regulation 5221
lays out significant levels for each of the pollutant subject to regulation and has a catchall phrase at the end -- if a significant level has not been determined, the significant level is zero. So that is the simple interpretation of the Agency's own regulations which are in place today.

JUDGE WOLQAST: Could you speak to how that then could or should in your view work on the ground in terms of establishing a BACT technology?

MR. NILLES: EPA obviously has discretion to set significance level for CO 2 . It has not done so. So at this point, pollutants that, for new major sources of -- it has to me a major source in order to be subject to the PSD program -- that is, it has to be one of the categories of 100 tons or one of the 250 -ton catchall facilities. And once it has done that, then BACT is required for each pollutant subject to regulation, regardless of amounts. So for

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| example, for Beryllium, which is permitted in | 1 aware that Sierra Club has taken the position |
| 2 pounds annually, there has to be a BAC | 2 since that regulation came on the books that |
| 3 limit. And in this case, we would say carbon | 3 it was a regulated pollutant prior to your |
| dioxide, which is not admitted in pounds, is | 4 assertion of your argument in this case? |
| 5 admitted in millions of tons, similarly would | MR. NILLES: I'm not aware of |
| 6 be subjected to a BACT | 6 Sierra Club prior to this case; i.e., post |
| JUDGE WOLQAST: Let me just you one | 7 Mass EPA, arguing in the NSR context that CO2 |
| other question just to make sure I understand | 8 is a regulated pollutant. That is correct. |
| 9 your position on the subject to regulation | JUDGE STEIN: One other question, |
| 10 issue. Do I understand it correctly that | 10 again dealing with the 2002 rulemaking. And |
| 11 your position is that EPA would not have th | 11 again, back to the question I just asked you |
| 12 discretion to prioritize whatever pollutants | 12 of the correct interpretation of the universe |
| 13 that they think may be more hazardous to b | 13 of NSR BACT pollutants. One of the things |
| 14 covered within the universe of an NSR | 14 that the December 31, 2002 regulation did was |
| 15 pollutant for BACT purposes? | 15 to exempt Section 112(b)(6) HAP pollutants. |
| MR. NILLES: That is correct. In | 16 How, in your view, could that legally be |
| 17 terms of the discretion of which pollutants | 17 correct, if in fact those are pollutants that |
| 18 are in or out, absolutely, because this is | 18 are regulated? |
| 19 a -- in the statute, it is any pollutant | 19 MR. NLLLES: Congress exclusively |
| 20 subject to regulation. Congress has ord | 20 said in 112 -- It think it is (a)(4), but in |
| 21 a regulation of carbon dioxide | 21 Section 112 Congress explicitly said these |
| 22 point, the Agency cannot say we can't address | 22 pollutants will not be subject to PSD. So |
| 43 |  |
| carbon dioxide. At that point, that | 1 what EPA was doing was taking the step |
| discussion is over. It can set a | 2 that -- statutory command from Congress and |
| 3 significance level. And there are other | 3 excluding those pollutants. |
| 4 things it can do in terms of how it is | 4 JUDGE REICH: Good. Thank you, |
| 5 implemented, but the question of whether CO 2 | 5 Mr . Nilles. |
| 6 is an NSR regulated pollutant, that has | 6 Mr. Russell? |
| already been resolved by Congress. | 7 MR. RUSSELL: Good morning. My |
| 8 JUDGE STEIN: I have two questions. | 8 name is Jim Russell. I'm with the law firm |
| One, EPA starts in its brief that there was | 9 of Winston \& Strawn on behalf of Christian |
| 10 no appeal of the 2002 rulemaking. | 10 County Generation. I would like first to |
| Do you dispute that? | 11 express our gratitude to the Court for going |
| 12 MR. NILLES: There was an appeal | 12 ahead with this argument in the absence of |
| 13 but my understanding is that it did not raise | 13 Illinois EPA. As you know, our Christian |
| ssue of CO 2 | 14 County Generation's permit is ineffective |
| 15 JUDGE STEIN: So there's no dispute | 15 because of the mere filing of this appeal. |
| 16 about whether the issue of CO 2 was raised in | 16 And in a \$2 billion construction |
| 17 that appeal? | 17 project like this, delay is very costly for |
| 18 MR. NILLES: Correct. To my | 18 financing reasons, construction reasons and |
| 19 knowledge, it was not raised. | 19 other reasons. And so any other further |
| 20 JUDGE STEIN: Given that the | 20 delay in the proceeding itself is even more |
| 21 rain monitoring regulations have been on the | 21 detrimental to us. We thank you for |
| 22 book since the early to mid '90s, are you | 22 proceeding with the argument. |


| We are here today to support the <br> Illinois EPA's response to the summary and its response in this case, and we support U.S. EPA, OAR/OGC brief. I believe it's fair to say that at the moment, there are three parties before you -- two of them government agencies -- who agree on the standing on the waiver issue. The U.S. EPA brief says that it agrees but doesn't deal with it. The Illinois brief says that it agrees and does deal with it. We feel strongly about it, and we deal with it in our brief. <br> And we believe that the record shows that the three parties before you: U.S. EPA, Illinois EPA and Christian County Generation, also agree on the so-called merits of the claim, with one reservation, and that being that the Illinois EPA brief in a footnote reserved any comment on whether or not Petitioner had raised a significant policy consideration. But it certainly agreed that Petitioner had raised no clearly | then you can feel free to reference those. <br> MR. RUSSELL: I do, and I thank <br> you, and that is what I'm going to get into. <br> Our overarching reading of this <br> case, both as to standing and the merits, is ubiquitous inconsistent statements, changing theories, changing facts, factual representations. And basically a difficulty we have in getting a handle on what it is that the Petitioner is really saying. <br> I know that you were commenting and this a little bit in Mr. Nilles' argument, but I would like to take you through some pieces of the reply brief and get into these point in a little more detail. <br> If you look at the reply brief summary page 2 -- and I'm sure you are familiar with it -- but third full paragraph, "when the comment period closed for the draft Christian County PSD permit, EPA, IEPA and the D.C. Circuit Court, the only Court to have ruled on the issue, were of the view |
| :---: | :---: |
| erroneous conclusion of law. And it dealt extensively with the merits as well. <br> Before I start -- I'd like to start <br> with the question, Your Honor, and that is about your ruling today that collateral impacts will form no part of this discussion. I assume that everything that Petitioner commented on in its written comments in the permit proceeding may still be commented on, even though it was in connection with collateral impacts. I have in mind several references and its public comments -- <br> JUDGE REICH: You can certainly reference it relative to the issues that are before us. <br> MR. RUSSELL: Okay. <br> JUDGE REICH: All I was suggesting <br> is that we didn't want to waste everybody's time talking about that issue itself since no one was before us. But if you think that there were comments made in that context that have relevance to the issue still before us, | that carbon dioxide is not a pollutant. The only court to have ruled on the issue were of the view that carbon dioxide is not a pollutant." <br> Well, Your Honor, the reason I <br> asked to comment on the Appellate Court opinion in Massachusetts versus EPA is that that is an untrue statement. As Your Honors may note, neither of the majority opinions said anything about that. <br> And Judge Tatel's dissenting opinion held the opposite. Petitioner was a party to that case at the appellate level. So it's difficult for us to understand why it is that a party to the appellate court litigation who obtains a dissenting opinion from Judge Tatel, 20-page opinion, ruling that CO 2 could be a regulated pollutant, why is that not reasonably ascertainable or reasonably available for purposes of our permit proceeding? <br> That ruling by the way was July 15, |

2005. Our comment period closed in 2007.

If we look at the next sentence in the reply brief, "prior to the Supreme Court ruling, which occurred after the comment period closed, it was reasonable" -- he means reasonably ascertainable -- "that the CO 2 BACT issue was a viable argument." It was not reasonably ascertainable. "But that it was a viable argument that would have received any attention from IEPA, EPA or any reviewing entity including this Board."

So now, a test is changing. As you well know, the reg says if there's a reasonably available, reasonably ascertainable, you must raise it.

But according to the reply brief, that is not necessarily true if it's not a viable argument. That's not necessarily true if it wouldn't have received any attention from Illinois EPA, EPA or any reviewing entity.

JUDGE REICH: You're not suggesting
51
that that argument wasn't received positively or are you -- you're just suggesting that they had an obligation to raise it even if they thought that they were going to be ruled against.

MR. RUSSELL: Yes. The reg is very clear. Your reg is very clear. Reasonably ascertainable. Reasonably available, you must raise it.

JUDGE STEIN: What's the practical consequence of that? Are we now, if we were to adopt your view of what "reasonably ascertainable" is, what does that mean for permit appeals and permit proceedings in the future? Are they going to be cluttered with arguments that have no practical chance under the current legal framework of success, and are we encouraging sort of -- sort of asking the flip side of the question I asked Mr. Nilles but -- but it is an issue I am quite concerned about in both directions.

MR. RUSSELL: It means that the
permit issuer is given a chance to respond to it , and that it's not thereafter raised here. That is the purpose, I believe, of the waiver doctrine, is to give the permit issuer a chance to respond. Here, that didn't happen because it wouldn't have received any attention.

JUDGE STEIN: So then what happens?
Sierra Club or someone similarly situated knows that the Massachusetts case is on appeal. They raise the argument before Illinois EPA. Illinois EPA says it's not regulated. Sierra Club then takes that to us. Massachusetts comes down. Then what do we do with it?

MR. RUSSELL: I don't know that Massachusetts changes anything. Massachusetts is being used here as a pretext for the lack of a prior argument that was very reasonably available and reasonably ascertainable.

JUDGE REICH: Apart from reasonably
ascertainable, I'm confused by the comment that Massachusetts doesn't change anything, in that way before you ever get to this subject to regulation language, you still have to get through this hurdle about whether or not it's an air pollutant.

And clearly in terms of the way the Agency addressed it, Massachusetts fundamentally did change things. So I understand the argument about reasonably ascertainable, but if you're suggesting that the picture didn't change after Massachusetts, I'm not understanding your argument.

MR. RUSSELL: Massachusetts authorized the Agency to regulate this air pollutant. The significance, the real significance, not for this case, but for those of us in the environmental bar, is the standing issue. That's what was revolutionary about Massachusetts versus EPA. And we support U.S. EPA's brief, insofar as
it's now addressing the prospect of regulating CO 2 , a global greenhouse gas.

So to answer Judge Stein's question, it's unclear to me how future judicial decisions would then change the pleading status of arguments that were pled because they were reasonably ascertainable or reasonably -- but the point is that that isn't relevant here. The permit issuer should be given the chance to deal with that one way or the other. And then it's up to you to determine whether or not the Court has somehow -- or the Supreme Court has somehow raised a moot argument that was previously not ascertainable or not available.

JUDGE REICH: But I do share to some degree Judge Stein's concern because I think, as I alluded to earlier, if you had had what I think was a very crystallized clear issue -- I mean, it may not have been clear in terms of what the decision would be -- but in terms of understanding what the
issue was, I think it was pretty clear.
There may be a whole host of court decisions that have some relevance but are a little bit more tangential. And I'm concerned about how far in the direction we have to push people to make arguments that might somehow suddenly become relevant for purposes of preserving that argument.

MR. RUSSELL: Well, you don't have to push in this case, Your Honor, because as I would like to explain, not only was it available and ascertainable in the appellate court litigation to which the Sierra Club was a party, but the Sierra Club commented on that point in the comments in this case, and have commented in another prior case. So if it is all right with you, may I go on to that?

Again, page 3 of the summary, about the sixth line from the bottom. For example, Sierra Club was one of the original parties that petitioned EPA to find carbon dioxide a
pollutant and regulate it under Title II of the Act. Yet somehow, it was not reasonable to raise that until Massachusetts versus EPA had been decided. Again, the Petitioner being a party. It's troubling to us why these arguments are not reasonably ascertainable and reasonably available.

Let's go on. Page 4, and this goes right to CFR 124.13. "Against this backdrop, and even though the controlling statutory and regulating law have not changed since 1993, when EPA adopted the Section 821 regulations, it was reasonable for Sierra Club to not raise the CO 2 BACT issue in this or any other permit proceeding until the Supreme Court resolved the issues in its favor."

Well, three points on that. Now, we have another testing grafted onto 40 CFR 124. Viable, receive any attention, and now whether it is reasonable to raise it. I don't think that's the spirit a letter of your regs. But secondly, they did raise it

1 in our case, and said the opposite. And that goes to page 6 of the written comments in the case. This is filed February 13 of this year. Even in the absence of U.S. EPA regulating carbon dioxide, Illinois EPA must still consider carbon dioxide as a non-regulated pollutant in the BACT analysis.

JUDGE REICH: But isn't that what just reinforces the fact Mr. Nilles' argument, whether you agree with it or not, that they were -- at the time they were commenting, they were dealing with the issue within the framework that they understood the EPA to be looking at the issue.

MR. RUSSELL: But again, Your Honor, the question is who decides what's reasonably ascertainable and what's reasonably available? They were making the argument in the Massachusetts case at the appellate level, still making it on the reply in the brief to Supreme Court, addressing it in our comments and saying the opposite. And
then as I will point out in a minute, a year before addressing it in other comments --

JUDGE REICH: But again, I -MR. RUSSELL: And saying -- again the opposite.

JUDGE REICH: They were addressing it in your comments and saying the opposite, not necessarily because they thought ultimately that was the correct answer, but because they thought that was the framework within which the Agency was approaching those issues.

And Mr. Nilles can correct me if I'm wrong on rebuttal, but it seems to me that that's what he is suggesting. It wasn't that they necessarily thought that that was the right answer, but they thought that was the framework the Agency was dealing with, and they chose, correctly or otherwise, to make their arguments solely within that framework.

MR. RUSSELL: Who can say what a

Petitioner's thought process was and whether or not it was legitimate and reasonable or viable or worthy of attention? I, as you know, thought we had a regulation on the point which is very clear. But --

JUDGE STEIN: If the purpose of the reason -- if among the purposes of the reasonably -- or of needing to raise a comment, is to allow the commenting authority the first opportunity to respond, and if it's reasonably clear in terms of the legal issue how the permitting authority would have responded prior to Massachusetts, how is it that in this particular circumstance, it's essential for that to have gone to the permitting Agency in the first place?

We're dealing with the circumstance where this issue is kicking around in at least three permit appeals in one form or another. There doesn't seem to be much dispute that had this issue been raised earlier, that Illinois EPA would have said,
"It's not regulated." Why is it that in this case, we should insist on giving IEPA an opportunity to say just that?

MR. RUSSELL: Well, Your Honor, respectfully, I suppose one can make educated guesses about what a permit issuer is going to do. Certainly, we advise clients based on reasonable guesses of what a permit issuer is going to do. But if you depart from a regulation, you're into a very subjective area as to what a Petitioner is or isn't supposed to do.

JUDGE WOLQAST: To ask a related question, does it matter that the comment would have raised a legal, rather than a factual or technical, issue to the permitting entity?

MR. RUSSELL: Probably not. The argument was reasonably ascertainable. Whatever it was that they wanted to say could have been said and was being said in court and in another proceeding. And in this
proceeding with an opposite message. So I think you're correct.

But the permit issuer ought to be given the chance to respond, and so should the permittee. The permittee deals with the permit issuer on a very collegial basis for a long period of time. And if the Illinois EPA says to the permittee, or the permit applicant, we think we have a problem here, permit applicant would like to be able to solve it in advance rather than have it litigated.

And that's where we are now, as we can talk about in just a minute. Is CO2 controlled by litigation? That's where we are going, apparently. Unless U.S. EPA's view and Illinois view prevails, which we agree with.

May I go on to one other comment?
JUDGE REICH: Please.
MR. RUSSELL: They did address it in our comments, said the opposite. That was
this year. But July 2006, in Deseret, they addressed it in comments. We asked for permission to comment on their comments, if not the Agency's response. And what they said, July 2006, "We believe that the EPA has a legal obligation to regulate CO 2 and other greenhouse gases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act. Indeed, 12 states, 14 environmental groups in two cities filed suites stating that EPA must regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act."

This by the way is the second full paragraph of page 2 of their comments in Deseret, which are in your docket. "The parties appealed the U.S. EPA's decision to reject a position that sought to have the federal government regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. The issue is now before the Supreme Court."

And Judge Stein, "if the Supreme Court agrees that the greenhouse gases such
as CO 2 must be regulated under the Clean Air Act, such a decision may also require the establishment of CO 2 emission limits in this permit."

So which is it? What is the story? Is it reasonably ascertainable when you advocate it, but not reasonably ascertainable when you said the opposite? Is that where we are on the standing issue?

It seems to me the regulation is very clear. If the regulation were not clear, that would be a different story. One other point on that, and that's summary page 4 -- strike that; I wanted to refer to page 5, and that is on Deseret, but following the Supreme Court's decision, the Sierra Club -- at the top of the page, following the Supreme Court's decision the Sierra Club had been raising this issue in subsequent permit proceedings. You just raised it in Deseret in July 2006. Supreme Court decision is 2007.

JUDGE REICH: I'd like to make sure we have all the time to address --

MR. RUSSELL: And I'm --
JUDGE REICH: The substance of the issue.

MR. RUSSELL: I'm ready to do that.
JUDGE WOLQAST: Could I ask you one on that?

MR. RUSSELL: Yes, please.
JUDGE WOLQAST: What is your best argument, as a matter of statutory interpretation, as to why the "subject to regulation" term, phrase, whatever, should not encompass the acid rain monitoring regulation?

MR. RUSSELL: The acid rain monitoring regulations talk only about monitoring.

JUDGE WOLQAST: But again, speaking to principles of statutory construction and the language subject to regulation --

MR. RUSSELL: Plain language. The
language is plain. It also regulates oxygen monitoring, I believe. Does that mean we limit oxygen because we monitor it?

JUDGE REICH: On that regard, in the reply brief, Sierra Club does discuss the fact that there's specific terminology used for when you're talking about an actual control of omissions. They talk about emission limitations, talk about emission standards. If what Congress was intending here was that something be subject to an actual control of regulations, why would they not have used a term like "emission limitations" or "emission standards" rather than "subject to regulation," which appears on its face to be potentially broader?

MR. RUSSELL: We agree with U.S. EPA's views of the subject to regulation issue. By the way, there has been a new change on that point, as you know, as of today. Subject to further regulation is --

JUDGE REICH: Oh.

MR. RUSSELL: So I've --
JUDGE REICH: When you talk about plain language, are you saying that that's the only way to read it, that it's not even a question of ambiguity where we get into Chevron deference, (?) that it's just absolutely clear on the face of it?

MR. RUSSELL: It doesn't make any sense to not use the plain language argument.

JUDGE REICH: Uh-huh.
MR. RUSSELL: If you don't use the plain language argument, what is the limitation? Well, there isn't one. If you don't use the plain language --

JUDGE WOLQAST: But to be clear, are you saying that "subject to regulation" has no ambiguity, that you can only read it to say subject to an emission limitation?

MR. RUSSELL: Subject to regulation is ambiguous, as was brought out in the petition for review in three different ways. In the reply brief, it's no longer ambiguous.

## 67

Subject to regulation can be read several ways. We like, and I believe it is correct, that the "otherwise" portion of "otherwise subject to regulation" shows what that means, in terms of the three prior categories that are regulated. So I -- I --

JUDGE WOLQAST: You're referring to the Illinois --

MR. RUSSELL: No, no. No. The --
JUDGE WOLQAST: Argument of the general --

MR. RUSSELL: And the --
JUDGE WOLQAST: Pacifist --
MR. RUSSELL: NSBS Title VI substances and those otherwise regulated.

JUDGE WOLQAST: I understand, but what I'm trying to ask is, are you agreeing with the Illinois argument that the otherwise subject to regulation, the so-called catchall or more generic provision, is somehow linked to the specifics of the three specified --

MR. RUSSELL: Yes.

JUDGE WOLQAST: Categories? MR. RUSSELL: Yes. That's my point. It is rendered nonsensical otherwise, if I can use that word.

JUDGE STEIN: How is it rendered nonsensical?

MR. RUSSELL: Because then it takes on a -- you have to read it in the context of what that says. Otherwise --

JUDGE STEIN: You could read it in context but I'm not sure that's the only reading of that provision.

MR. RUSSELL: This is a --
JUDGE STEIN: I mean, here --
MR. RUSSELL: Our position is that you take the plain language, if it makes sense -- which this does. The Petitioner's arguments here are so stretched on "otherwise regulated" that they don't make common sense.

JUDGE STEIN: What if we were agreed to you that the notion of otherwise regulated stretched to its limits may not
make sense, but here we're dealing with Section 821 of the Clean Air Act, which was specifically put into the statute by Congress that thought it was sufficiently important.

MR. RUSSELL: Right.
JUDGE STEIN: That they put in a monitoring provision in the form of a regulation. I mean, let's take that example.

MR. RUSSELL: Okay.
JUDGE STEIN: Why is that that is not subsumed under category 4 ?

MR. RUSSELL: Why then do you need Massachusetts versus EPA to authorize U.S. EPA to regulate carbon dioxide?

JUDGE STEIN: But isn't that a separate question -- doesn't that then go to what did Congress mean by the term "pollutant" as opposed to what did Congress mean by the term "regulation"?

MR. RUSSELL: It goes to the regulation point and whether or not it was already regulated. Why do we -- is.

JUDGE REICH: Are you saying
Massachusetts somehow addressed the question of subject to regulation, as opposed to addressing the question of what a pollutant

MR. RUSSELL: I'm sorry. Say again, Your Honor.

JUDGE REICH: The way you phrased that, I was not sure if you suggesting that somehow the Court went beyond the issue of whether CO 2 is a pollutant and addressed the question of subject to regulation?

MR. RUSSELL: No, it did not. It's a standing case. And it's an authorization to regulate CO 2 for mobile (?) sources. Again -- my time is almost up. On the merits, if you accept this point of view, we will be in a patchwork quilt of stationary source CO 2 controls, dictated by litigants on a localized basis much like product liability

There are regulations for
automobiles, for example, automobile safety.
But if you go through the owners manual of your vehicle, you will find with whatever brand it is that it is filled with warning labels on this point and that point and the other point. All those warning labels came from litigation rather than a statute or a regulation.

JUDGE STEIN: Wouldn't this just go through --

MR. RUSSELL: That's why the --
JUDGE STEIN: The ordinary BACT process? In other words, if this issue, if we were to agree that the issue were ripe, if we were to agree as a legal matter that a BACT limit needed to be set, wouldn't it simply go back to the permitting authority to basically perform a BACT analysis, which by definition is a case-by-case analysis?

MR. RUSSELL: What would that be,
Your Honor?
JUDGE STEIN: Presumably, that's
for the permitting authority to decide in the first instance.

MR. RUSSELL: That's my point. And they would apply their SIP whether it's approved or not. And the SIP is going to have some requirements, some emission limitations. But right now, yes, it's --

JUDGE STEIN: I'm not disagreeing with you that you may or may not want a patchwork. All I'm saying is that BACT in general is a process that takes a variety of things into account, and that unlike some other programs where what gets applied is a little less case by case, it seems to me in this particular circumstance when you're dealing with PSD, it certainly is a program that unlike some other purely technology-based programs is more susceptible.

I mean, I understand your overall point that you're sort of taking a leap from no regulation into sort of a new area, case
by case. But I still think that in the PSD program, that is something you have done more often than in some of the other programs.

MR. RUSSELL: Well, I agree with you. The statute says case by case.

JUDGE REICH: Do you agree that BACT is intended to be technology forcing?

MR. RUSSELL: It can be. And we've certainly -- Illinois (?) had --

JUDGE REICH: Uh-huh.
MR. RUSSELL: Going back to the ${ }^{\prime} 70 \mathrm{~s}$, technology forcing regulations.

JUDGE REICH: Uh-huh.
MR. RUSSELL: I'm out of time, I'm sorry. But the statutory language on case by case I don't think equates to purely individual ad hoc spontaneous. There is a guidance process. There has been in the NSR guidance process. The Agency is working on a regulation -- U.S. EPA is working on a regulation that has global implications. To me, if you were to ask me about the policy,
the sense of it, I see it to be very counterproductive to have individual litigants dictating BACT site by site in the absence of some level of guidance which a permit issuer looks to but need not always comply with.

JUDGE REICH: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Russell.

MR. RUSSELL: That is all I had. And I thank you for your time.

JUDGE REICH: Appreciate that.
Mr. Doster. First of all,
Mr. Doster, I want to express our appreciation for your appearing before us since you're appearing at the Board's request rather than your own initiative.

MR. DOSTER: It's my pleasure. I appreciate actually having the opportunity to speak to these issues. I'm appearing here on behalf of the Office of Air and Radiation, as you requested. I'm prepared to address the waiver issue if you would like to have
questions from me on that, but since you
asked us to directly address the merits, I'm going to move immediately to that.

JUDGE REICH: Why don't you do that, and then if any of the judges have questions on the waiver, they can raise that at the end.

MR. DOSTER: Okay. On the merits, the question before you here today is really very simple. Should the Board reverse 30-year history of EPA interpreting the term "subject to regulation under the Act"? The only reasonable answer to this question is no, for two principal reasons.

First, since the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, the EPA has repeatedly and consistently in a litany of examples that I will run through with you here today construed the phrase subject to regulation to describe only air pollutants subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that
pollutant.
Second, because EPA's long-standing interpretation that has stood the test of time is a permissible one, given the context of the statute in which the phrase subject to regulation appears in the context of a controlled technology requirement based on best available control technology.

JUDGE REICH: When you say it's permissible, does that mean that you're suggesting that there is more than one possible interpretation, and this is a case of Chevron deference?

MR. DOSTER: In one respect, there is. In an other respect, there is not.
First and foremost, Section 821 of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments is not a part of the Clean Air Act, our brief in fact was mistaken on that. An error that I would like to correct for the record.

Section 821 of the '90 amendments had not been codified in the Clean Air Act. 77

It appears as the note to Section 412 of the Clean Air Act. It was never codified. So in that sense, this is not a Chevron II issue. Under the Act -- the Section 821 monitoring requirement is not under the Act. And that's clear.

On that question of the meaning of "subject to regulation," or the term "regulation" within that phrase, I do believe that this is a Chevron II issue, where there may be more than one potential interpretation. However, EPA's interpretation is a permissible one and a reasonable one that has existed for 30 years and is supported by many, many instances of Agency precedent practice.

Ever since the 1978 rulemaking when Administrator Cossell first addressed this issue, and issued the first PSD regulations after the ' 77 amendments, it was clear, and by the list of pollutants that were -- or the list of things that were covered by the BACT

1 at that time, that it was NAX pollutants, it
was NSPS pollutants and NISHAP pollutants or Title II mobile source pollutants.

There's never been any question
since that time that that's what regulation meant in the Agency's view, and that was a reasonable interpretation. In the Alabama Power case, the Court did not consider the question before you here toady. The issue in that case was whether a much narrower interpretation advocated by the -- the industry petitioners in that case should have been adopted by EPA.

In that case, the industry petitioners advocated that subject to regulation should be limited to only two pollutants, PM and SO 2 , which were the only pollutants for which Congress had established PSD increments at that time. So the court's decision in that case rejected that interpretation and upheld the Administrator's 1978 interpretation. It did not expand on
the Administrator's interpretation, as the Petitioners argue here.

Though it many have used somewhat expansive language, all it was doing was affirming the interpretation at that time that Administrator Cossell had set forth in the final rule under review, which was that "subject to regulation" referred to pollutants that were subject to an actual emission standard at the time.

JUDGE STEIN: But surely you're not suggesting that this Board, as the final decisionmaker for the Agency, is constrained in a way that a Court might be in a Chevron II situation?

MR. DOSTER: No. No, I'm not suggesting that the -- you know, you are reaching a final decision on behalf of the Agency. So the considerations for you are also whether it's an appropriate interpretation or a right interpretation from a policy standpoint. History has suggested
that that is. We've been using this interpretation for some time, including since the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act.

There is no indication in the legislative history on the 1990 amendment that added Section 821 of the ' 90 amendments that the sponsors of that amendment intended for that to invoke NSR. In fact, they specifically said in the legislative history that it was not their intent -- I will quote from a statement of Congressman Cooper, who was one of the sponsors of that amendment on May 17, 1990 -- said, "My amendment would not force any reductions right now." It was clearly not his intent to invoke the subject to regulation phrase in the BACT definition.

JUDGE REICH: I saw the language, but I know that it said "force any reductions," which is suggestive of reducing current emissions from an existing facility. That's a little different in character than really regulating a facility not yet built.

So I'm not sure if that language is
compelling.
MR. DOSTER: Maybe not dispositive, but the overall context of the amendment was also to ensure that our sources in the United States were to get credit for any reductions that were made as a result of regulation in the future. The context of it was not with the perspective that we were expecting there to be regulation under the PSD program.

JUDGE REICH: Uh-huh.
MR. DOSTER: It was in the context of in the event we were -- entering into an intemational agreement that would call for reductions in the future, that we would know what our reductions were, what our baseline was in 1990, and that was the intent of the sponsors of the amendment at the time.

JUDGE WOLQAST: Could you speak to Mr. Nilles' point, that if Congress had intended "subject to regulation" to be more narrowly construed to only include emission
limitations, it could readily have said that.
MR. DOSTER: It could have readily have defined the term "regulation." It could have adopted the Webster's Dictionary definition that has been cited, but the Congress did not. I think if you look at Black's Law Dictionary, the definition of "regulation" in Black's Law Dictionary Eighth Edition is the act or process of controlling by rule or restriction.

That's consistent with the interpretation that the EPA has followed for the last 30 years. So perhaps because Congress adopted no definition of the term regulation, that it felt it was not necessary to specify what it meant because under the Black's Law Dictionary, what it meant was clear. And how it had been used ever since the 1977 amendments was apparent.

So 1 don't think it was necessary for -- regulation is not defined anywhere else. So it wasn't necessary for the

Congress to specify differently or to explicitly say that emission limitations was --

JUDGE WOLQAST: So are you saying that there's no ambiguity to the phrase "subject to regulation"?

MR. DOSTER: No, I'm not, because they've cited another dictionary definition that that they purport to have a different meaning. But I think Congress's intent, that it intended it to be consistent with EPA's interpretation -- Congress did not change it in the 1990 amendments. Congress did not inform EPA after 13 years of history interpreting the term subject to regulation and the rules that we had written that we needed to interpret regulation to cover monitoring requirements. It had an opportunity to do that and did not do so.

JUDGE STEIN: Why does Congress exclude HAPS from being considered NSR pollutants, point one. And point two, why
didn't they expand that to uncover CO 2 , given
Section 821 ?
MR. DOSTER: I'm not directly familiar with the exact reasons why Congress excluded HAPS, but I think it was just an administrative factor, that in fact HAPS had been covered, but they had amended Section 112 in 1990 and created a new framework for the MACT standard and the MACT requirement. So I would speculate that that was because it would be redundant to then require BACT for hazardous air pollutants, because they had established a technology mandate in the 1990 amendments that did not exist prior to the 1990 amendments.

Prior to the 1990 amendments, HAPS were addressed under a risk-based framework which had been unsuccessful and had taken a great deal of time. So I would surmise, though I haven't seen the specific legislative history, that its intent was to avoid the redundancy between BACT and 85

MACT. Sorry, you had a second part to your question.

JUDGE STEIN: The second part of that was that given that in 1990 they were excluding a certain class of pollutants from regulation as NSR pollutants --

MR. DOSTER: I would --
JUDGE STEIN: At the same time that they -- you know, put in Section 821 as a note that they exclude CO 2 from regulation -- from the NSR --

MR. DOSTER: The same rationale that I surmise wouldn't exist then, that there wouldn't be redundancy with the MACT requirement, with the technology-based requirement for CO 2 . But there was -- you know, there's no indication of an intent by Congress at that time to have in fact contemplated that CO 2 would immediately be covered by the PSD program as a result of the Section 821 addition to the 1990 amendments.

So we don't really have any -- we
have no clear indication that that was in fact their intent. We have an amendment in 1990 that was not updating the Clean Air Act itself -- not codified in the Act, that followed the original definition, the original language "subject to regulation, under the Act" was issued in 1977. It was passed by Congress in 1977.

There was no indication of an integration in that. Congress was not amending Section 165 in the 1990 amendments.
So if they had intended for CO 2 to have been covered, they could have amended Section 165 at that time, rather than writing a provision that didn't even get codified in the Act itself.

JUDGE STEIN: So in your view, what's the significance of the fact that it wasn't ultimately codified?

MR. DOSTER: I think it reflects somewhere in the history an intent to be very clear that this was not a regulated
pollutant. It certainly was not intended to
be incorporated into the NSR program. And we have researched the issue and tried to figure out the origins of that. And these things are apparently done through a committee of people that consider it, and they didn't deem it to be sufficiently related to any provision of the Act itself to be codified.

JUDGE REICH: So basically you are saying that it could not be covered by Section $5221 \mathrm{~B}(50)$ (iv), because that says that any pollutant that otherwise is subject to regulation under the Act -- and this is not subject to regulation under the Act, because that provision is not codified.

MR. DOSTER: Right.
JUDGE REICH: Can I ask about something a little bit different just for clarification? In your brief, on page 5 , when you're talking about the 2002 rulemaking, and the list that I referred to earlier that listed currently regulated
pollutants but did not include CO 2 , you say a list that did not include CO 2 , even though EPA guidance existed at that time that considered CO 2 to be an air pollutant, you don't reference what that guidance was.

Was that the Cannon Memo?
MR. DOSTER: Correct. Yes, it was the Cannon Memo from 1998, which was basically the interpretation that the Supreme Court ultimately adopted. And at that time, it -- General Counsel Cannon, in that memo, also stated very clearly that CO 2 was not a regulated pollutant.

And I would like to read a quote from that memo that I think is very instructive in terms of EPA's history on this issue. The general counsel stated, "EPA has a legal obligation to regulate CO 2 and other greenhouse gases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act." Sorry, this is the wrong quite. Different -- different one. That's the one that Mr. Russell read earlier.

If I could -- "EPA's regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act extends to air pollutants which as discussed above are defined broadly under the Act and include SO 2 , not CO 2 and Mercury emitted into the ambient air. EPA has in fact already regulated each of these substances under the Act, with the exception of CO 2 . While CO 2 emissions are within the scope of the EPA's authority to regulate, the administrator has made no determination to date to exercise that authority under the specific criteria provided under any provision of the Act."

JUDGE REICH: And as far as you understand it as of the day of promulgation of the 2002 Federal Register Notice of this, that was still EPA's interpretation.

MR. DOSTER: The Fabricant memo
that changed that interpretation was in 1993.
JUDGE STEIN: In 2003.
MR. DOSTER: I'm sorry. 2003. JUDGE REICH: 2003.

MR. DOSTER: Thanks. So it --
JUDGE REICH: I'm assuming there was a period of evolution before the Fabricant memo was actually issued, and I just want confirmation and your understanding that as of December 21, 2002, that was still the operative interpretation.

MR. DOSTER: As far as the Office of General Counsel was concerned, that is my understanding.

JUDGE STEIN: I wanted to ask you a question about the 2002 amendments. Illinois, as I've mentioned before, made an argument that $5221(50)$ (iv) should be interpreted essentially narrowly, or in the light of the fact that (i), (ii), and (iii) are fairly specifically defined terms. What's the Agency's view?

MR. DOSTER: We agree with that interpretation. That is consistent with what we have always done historically. If we read subject to regulation differently at the time
we had adopted it, we presumably would have
done what Petitioners are advocating here today. We understood subject to regulation in the context with that list. We understood it to be covering things that were like the things that are already in that list, that were pollutants, that were subject to a specific requirement for control.

JUDGE STEIN: Can you identify for me any pollutants that are not covered in (i), (ii) or (iii) that are covered by (iv)?

MR. DOSTER: Yes. But they are covered in the sense that they might -- well, okay. I -- I understand your question. I was thinking it was a different one.

JUDGE STEIN: Answer that one, too.
MR. DOSTER: What I thought you were asking is that there are other pollutants that are currently unregulated that are not subject to regulation.
Pollutants like HAPS that we de-listed, and things of that nature. The specific question
of are there any pollutants on that list, let me see if I can look at the list itself in our 2002 rule and see if I can identify one of those that would fit in that category.

Actually, I don't think I can even do that by looking at the list. I'm not familiar with all the details of the NSPS, and which various provisions that those come from. So I don't --

JUDGE STEIN: But nothing leaps out to mind of something that isn't on (i), (ii) or (iii) that fits into this catchall, however broad or narrow?

MR. DOSTER: Nothing immediately comes to mind. I think one thing that is notable is that the catchall, the list that was promulgated does not include Title II, pollutants covered by Title II mobile sources, though in 1978, the Administrator recognized those as potential -- as an area that would be subject to regulation. So the 2002 did not enumerate the Title II
pollutants. So that is a potential category, to the extent there was a pollutant that would be covered under Title II that is not covered under Title I anywhere. But I don't know. I can't identify one of these.

JUDGE WOLQAST: What would you point us to as the Agency's most clear interpretation of subject to regulation?

MR. DOSTER: The clearest interpretation -- in terms of this interpretation is what we stated in our papers is that it refers to something that is subject to -- actually subject to an emissions limitation.

JUDGE WOLQAST: Other than your argument, the --

MR. DOSTER: Are you --
JUDGE WOLQAST: A past Agency --
MR. DOSTER: Are you really asking
what is our statutory -- what is our
interpretation as to why it's a reasonable -JUDGE WOLQAST: Either --

|  | 94 |  | 96 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | MR. DOSTER: Interpretation -- |  | is a specific consideration of the issue |
|  | JUDGE WOLQAST: Statutory or |  | raised by Petitioner of the argument that |
|  | regulatory interpretation of 5221, a past |  | Section 821 of the 1990 amendments has |
|  | clear statement of the Agency interprets |  | significance in this issue. In the 2002 |
|  | subject to regulations. |  | rulemaking, we did not get a comment -- even |
|  | MR. DOSTER: In terms of a single |  | though this issue was clearly ascertainable, |
|  | rpretation, the clearest statement with |  | his issue was ascertainable since 1990. |
| 8 | respect to the issue before you is from the | 8 | In 1996, EPA published a list in |
|  | 1993 Wegman memo, where the specific issue of |  | the proposal of those pollutants that it |
| 10 | Section 821 of the 1990 amendments wa |  | thought were regulated. We received no |
|  | addressed in the context of the question of |  | comment in that rulemaking that CO 2 should be |
|  | does "subject to regulation |  | that list. Or at least the final preamble |
| 13 | JUDGE WOLGAST: I did want to ask | 13 | shows no indication of that comment. I |
|  | you about that, because I'm wondering, what's |  | haven't scoured the record, but the final |
|  | the vitality of the Wegman memo | 15 | preamble shows no indication -- comment or |
|  | post-Massachusetts? And I ask that because |  | put the issue of Section 821 directly to the |
|  | while I understand the logic of the Wegman |  | agency. |
| 18 | memo, the premise of the analysis was a more | 18 | And so we listed those pollutants |
| 19 | narrow interpretation of the term |  | that were understood to be regulated at that |
| 20 | "pollutant." |  | time. But it's a definitive list, as Judge |
|  | MR. DOSTER: There | 21 | Reich pointed earlier, the prefatory language |
| 22 | premises of that analysis. One was what does |  | on that page of the 2002 rulemaking lists all |
|  | 95 |  |  |
|  | the term "air pollutant" mean in the context |  | of the pollutants that EPA considered to be |
| 2 | of Title V, and that interpretation was it |  | subject to regulation at the time. So it is |
| 3 | means a pollutant subject to regulation. But |  | certainly not -- there's not an affirmative |
|  | he second premise is what is a "pollutant |  | answer to the issue raised here by the Board, |
|  | subject to regulation." And on the first |  | but it's clearly a recognition that there's |
| 6 | premise, we've stated in our brief -- and |  | no regulation in place under our prevailing |
| 7 | agree that the Supreme Court decision no |  | interpretation of "subject to regulation" |
|  | longer makes that premise viable, that the | 8 | that would make CO 2 an NSR pollutant. |
|  | reasoning of that memo was basically | 9 | JUDGE STEIN: I asked a question I |
|  | overruled by the Supreme Court decision, but |  | believe to our -- I had a colloquy with |
|  | on the second premise, what "does subject to |  | Mr. Russell about the practical consequences |
|  | regulation" mean, the Supreme Court decision |  | of treating CO 2 as a pollutant or the |
| 13 | has not addressed that issue. |  | regulatory -- and I'd be interested in the |
|  | And the Agency's interpretation |  | Agency's views on the matter -- view of the |
|  | remains consistent with what it was in that |  | atter. In terms of permitting, what in |
|  | mo, and has been for the last 30 years, |  | actical terms that would mean. And |
| 7 | including 17 since the 1990 amendments. |  | certainly in the -- well, in the acid rain |
| 8 | JUDGE STEIN: How does the Wegman | 18 | context in particular. |
|  | mo differ from the statement in the 2002 | 19 | MR. DOSTER: The practical |
|  | ambular text? I mean, you've obviously |  | nsequences if this board were to determine |
|  | pointed to the Wegman memo rather than the -- |  | that -- |
| 22 | MR. DOSTER: It differs because it | 22 | JUDGE STEIN: Right, yeah, in other |

words --
MR. DOSTER: It is subject to regulation now?

JUDGE STEIN: More from a permitting agency's perspective. I mean, what it would mean for the regions or for state permitting agencies if they were suddenly, in the absence of further guidance from the Agency, to have to grapple with what that means in the context of the individual department. I think --

MR. DOSTER: We are currently in -- I'm not sure I'm the best person to speak to this issue. We have a number of staff in the Agency that are currently very actively studying those issues right now, and are considering a number of the implications of what they would be. There are issues with what the significance rate would be and how we would determine the number of sources. There are issues with what would BACT be -- there's no viable sequestration
technology at this moment, so what would BACT be, even if we could capture CO 2 , as we might with the particular facility at issue here, an IGCC facility, what would we do with it? How would -- where would we put it?

Sequestration has not been established yet as a technology, so those questions are under review, and I don't know that I'm at liberty or have the expertise to really discuss them in more depth, but you know, we do believe there will be many significant implications if - - and sudden and drastic if this board were to agree with the Petitioners.

JUDGE REICH: Thank you, Mr. Doster.

Mr. Nilles, you have 10 minutes for rebuttal.

MR. NILLES: Thank you, Your Honor. A couple of quick points. As we laid out, we believe this is a very simple question of statutory interpretation, controlled, if you
will, by the framework laid in Chevron
Step I. As an alternative -- and this goes to your point, Judge Wolgast, the Agency argues its ambiguity. Ambiguity, their interpretation has to be reasonable; cannot be arbitrary and capricious. There is simply no Agency explanation anywhere in the record that lays out in any meaningful language an analysis how do you get from the word "regulation" -- and Mr. Doster talked about regulation must mean something else.

Well, Congress used the word "regulation" in 165, it used "regulation" in 821, there's no indication of it using different terms, and if means regulation in one place, there's again, no indication they meant otherwise. The Agency doesn't explain how do you get from the definition of regulation as it is used in both the PSD program and the definition of BACT , to meaning something equivalent to emission control or emission standard.

The Wegman memo, as you point out, has been -- the central core of that memo was tossed out by the Supreme Court in terms of what is a pollutant. And again, that memo was not getting at the core question in laying out and really parsing the language of the statute or the regulations, and answering the question, how does one interpret regulation at the end of the day to mean something less than that term is used in general parlance.

That memo was dealing with Title V. It doesn't mention the language in 165 , it doesn't explain how the Agency is getting to its conclusion that it enunciates today that somehow carbon dioxide is not a pollutant "subject to regulation." So at a minimum, if the Board determines that this is not a straight question of statutory interpretation, at a minimum, we recommend that the Board remandate that decision back to the Agency and ask for an explanation in
light of Mass. v. EPA, in light of a lack of a record demonstrating how it reached this legal conclusion, and provide the opportunity for public comment to have a full record on which this board could make a more reasoned decision.

A couple other quick points.
Mr. Russell referred to our comments in
Deseret, the bonanza (?) project that is pending before this board. In our comments, he failed to go to the next sentence where we lay out, yes, the Supreme Court did in fact have this case on review, but we go on to say at a minimum, EPA should consider CO 2 in the BACT analysis and then go on to talk about "as an unregulated pollutant."

So back when we filed these comments in Deseret, we were again flagging the Supreme Court maybe taking this issue up, but the framework that was in place back before the Supreme Court ruling was that it was an unregulated pollutant.

And one final point on the 2002 preamble that we talked about that the Board has asked questions about. EPA does list the pollutants in the Federal Register notice that are in its view subject to PSD, but at that point, the Agency was of the view, as it enunciated a few months later in the Fabricant memo, CO 2 was not a pollutant.

JUDGE REICH: So you're basically saying that notwithstanding the representation from Mr. Doster that as of that date, even though the only published guidance was the Cannon memo, that the Agency had already changed its interpretation?

MR. NILLES: There had obviously been a very strong signal from the administration that it was taking a very different tack on carbon dioxide, and that was manifested months later with the Fabricant memo.

JUDGE REICH: Is there something on or before that date that documents where the

| 106 | 108 |
| :---: | :---: |
| are working on power plant reduction measures | 1 Section 821 wasn't actually codified in the |
| 2 through the regional Greenhouse Gas | 2 Clean Air Act, it cannot be a regulation |
| Initiative, they're working to cut their | 3 "subject to regulation" within the meaning of |
| 4 emissions by about 24 million tons a year by | 4 Section 165? |
| 2020. Seven Northeast states from all the | MR. NILLES: Your Honor, it's the |
| power plants. Two coal plants proposed in | 6 first time we've heard that argument. I |
| the Midwest; 24 million tons. | 7 guess I would go back to -- in 1978 when EPA |
| So the environmental consequences | 8 adopted the first PSD regulations and was |
| of waiting until the end of 2008 for another | 9 interpreting what does "subject to |
| 10 dozen, two dozen, three dozen coal plants to | 10 regulation" means, and I think Brian Doster |
| 11 get approved without any CO 2 controls, we're | 11 mentioned that it's pollutants including the |
| 12 talking about tens -- dozens and dozens of | 12 NAAQS, the NSPS has its air pollutants in |
| 13 millions of tons of carbon dioxide. And as a | 13 Title II, but it also says, any pollutant |
| 14 practical matter, these are projects that if | 14 regulated under Subchapter C of Title 40 of |
| 15 they have to do some CO 2 control in the | 15 the CFR. That's where the 821 regulations |
| 16 future, it may be either infeasible or at |  |
| 17 huge, enormous costs. So from the practical | 17 So back in 1978, the regulations |
| 18 matter, again, the sooner we do this, the | 18 that EPA were saying at that point equaled |
| 19 bette | 19 subject to regulations were in fact added in |
| 20 In terms of the robustness of the | 201993 by EPA in 821. Honestly, I can't speak |
| 21 BACT process, Judge Stein, as you indicated, | 21 to was it in the act or out of the act, but |
| 22 the BACT process lays out a long-time | 22 as a practical matter, EPA has interpreted it |
| 107 | 109 |
| five-step process that considers energy, | 1 obviously as part of the Clean Air Act, and |
| 2 economics, and environmental consequences, | 2 it's a part of the CFR where EPA all of its |
| and we believe that it would be very simple | 3 other Clean Air Act regulations today. |
| to plug in CO 2 into that process and work out | JUDGE REICH: Thank you, |
| 5 does it make economic sense, and identify at | Mr. Nilles. |
| 6 step one all the technologies, and then go | MR. NILLES: Thank you. |
| 7 through that rigorous process that has been | JUDGE REICH: I appreciate the |
| done for all the other pollutants. And | 8 argument of counsel. I think it was a very |
| 9 there's no reason we can't do that today for | 9 good argument, very helpful for the Board in |
| 10 carbon dioxide emissions. | 10 understanding the issues being presented. We |
| 11 I want to just go back to the | 11 will obviously take this matter under |
| 12 waiver issue. It's clear that if we had | 12 advisement. |
| 13 raised this issue, the practical consequences | 13 This hearing is adjourned. |
| 14 would have been exactly the same. We would | 14 (Whereupon, at approximately |
| 15 be in the same place today if we had raised | 15 11:45 a.m., the HEARING was |
| 16 it. So I just want to note that Illinois EPA | 16 adjourned.) |
| 17 and EPA and Christian County all argue it | 17 ** |
| 18 doesn't apply, we would be in the same place | 18 |
| 19 today whether or not we had raised it back | 19 |
| 20 before Mass. v. EPA. | 20 |
| 21 JUDGE WOLGAST: Could you speak to | 21 |
| 22 Mr. Doster's argument that because | 22 |


| A | 89:4, 8, 13 | Administ. | 42:22 53:8 | 62:11 63:1 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| abandoning | 108:2,21 | 78:21 79:1 | 53:16 | 69:2 74:20 |
| 37:6 | 108:21 | admitted | 58:11,18 | 75:16,20 |
| ability | 109:1,3 | 42: 4, 5 | 59:16 | 76:17,18 |
| 36:20 | actively | adopt 28:20 | 73:19 | 76:22 77:2 |
| able 4:9 | 98:16 | 51:12 | 77:16 | 80:3 84:12 |
| 61:10 | actual 30:1 | adopted $34: 3$ | 79:13,19 | 86:3 88:4 |
| above-en | 34:2 65:7 | 35:8 38:7 | 93:18 94:4 | 88:20 89:2 |
| 1:11 | 65:12 | 56:12 | 96:17 98:9 | 89:3,6 |
| absence | 75:22 79:9 | $78: 13$ 82:4 | 98:15 | 95:1 108:2 |
| 45:12 57:4 | Act's $36: 6$ | 82:14 | 100:3.7.17 | 108:12 |
| 74:4 98:8 | ad 73:17 | 88:10 91:1 | 101:14,22 | 109:1,3 |
| 105:16 | add 28:10 | 108:8 | 103:6,13 | Alabama |
| absolutely | added 29:5,6 | adopting | 104:18 | 35:12,20 |
| 42:18 66:7 | 80:6 | 32:19 | agency's | $36: 2$ 37:17 |
| abut 8: 17 | 108:19 | advance | 19:19 41:6 | 78:7 |
| accept $39: 13$ | addition | 61:11 | 62:4 78:6 | aligned 4:15 |
| 70:17 | 12:3 85:21 | advise 60:7 | 90:18 93:7 | allocated |
| accepted | address 13:4 | advisement | 95:14 | 3:16,20 |
| 5:15 | 13:11 | 109:12 | 97:14 98:5 | 4:14 |
| accepting | 15:22 27:5 | advocate | 104:1 | allow 59 : 9 |
| 6:4 | 27:15 28:1 | 63:7 | 105:2 | alluded |
| access 104:2 | 34:15 | advocated | agree 17:7,9 | 54:18 |
| account | 38:16 | 78:11,15 | 18:5 19:15 | alternate |
| 72:12 | 42:22 | advocating | 20:19 46:7 | 8:2 |
| acid 8:1 | 61:21 64:2 | 91:2 | 46:16 | alternative |
| 16:11 | 74:21 75:2 | affirmative | 57:10 | 10:18 |
| 28:20 | addressed | 97:3 | 61:18 | 100:2 |
| 29:18 37:9 | 53:8 62:2 | affirming | 65:17 | Alternat |
| 43:20 | 70:2,11 | 79:5 | 71:14,15 | 13:16 |
| 64:14,16 | 77:18 | afford 39:12 | 73: 4, 6 | ambient 89:6 |
| 97:17 | 84:17 | agencies | 90:19 95:7 | ambiguity |
| act 13:13 | 94:11 | 46:7 98:7 | 99:13 | 25:15 38:4 |
| 21:13 | 95:13 | agency $1: 1$ | agreed 46:22 | 66:5,17 |
| 28:10,18 | addressing | $1: 13 \quad 2: 6.8$ | 68:21 | 83:5 100:4 |
| 31:11 32:5 | 11:1 32:16 | 4:7 13:3 | agreeing | 100:4 |
| 35:9,11 | 54:1 57:21 | 13:11 | 36:9 67:17 | ambiguous |
| 38:1,10 | 58:2,6 | 16:18 | agreement | 66:20,22 |
| 39:17 56:2 | 70:4 | 17:16 | 81:14 | amended 3:13 |
| 62:8,12 | adjourned | 18:13 | agrees 36:7 | 28:10,18 |
| 63:2 69:2 | 109:13,16 | 20:10 | 46:9,10 | 84:7 86:13 |
| 75:12,16 | administ | 21:16 22:5 | 62:22 | amending |
| 76:17,18 | 103:17 | 22:9 23:9 | ahead 45:12 | 86:11 |
| 76:22 77:2 | administ... | 23:11,15 | air 3: 20 | amendment |
| 77:4,5 | 84:6 | 24:5 27:20 | 6:20,22 | 80:5,7,12 |
| 80:3 82:9 | administ... | 27:20 32:3 | 28:10,18 | 80:13 81:4 |
| 86:3,4,7 | 77:18 79:6 | 33:5 34:8 | 29:7,16 | 81:18 86:2 |
| 86:15 87:8 | 89:10 | 35:2,5 | 30:9 34:11 | amendments |
| 87:13,14 | 92:19 | 36:20 39:1 | 39:17 53:6 | 75:15 |
| 88:20 89:2 | 104:9 | 39:22 | 53:16 62:8 | 76:17,21 |


| $77: 20 \quad 80: 3$ | appealed | area 60:11 | 5:7,10 | 22:19 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 80:6 82:19 | 62:16 | $72: 22$ | 14:12 17:5 | attended |
| $83: 13$ | appeals $1: 1$ | 92:20 | 17:8 22:17 | 12:22 |
| 84:14, 15 | 51:14 | argue 11:7 | 26:22 | attention |
| 84:16 | 59:19 | 12:11 79:2 | 51:16 54:6 | 50:10,19 |
| 85:21 | APPEARANCES | 107:17 | $55: 656: 6$ | 52:7 56:19 |
| 86:11 | 2:1 | argued 4:21 | 58:20 | 59:3 |
| 90:12 | appearing | 13:21 14:1 | 68:18 | Attorney |
| 94:10 | 3:22 74:14 | 14:5,15 | 105:14 | $4: 12$ |
| 95:17 96:3 | 74:15,19 | 23:2 | ARN $2: 9$ | authority |
| amount 11:2 | appears | argues 15:16 | arrive 40:19 | 15:22 |
| amounts | 40:17 | 100:4 | ascertai | $38: 2159: 9$ |
| 41:22 | $65: 15 \quad 76: 6$ | arguing 6:12 | 11:18 12:4 | 59:12 |
| analysis | 77:1 | 22:3 25:7 | 12:8 17:21 | $71: 17$ 72:1 |
| 5:18 13:16 | appellate | $26: 7$ 35:15 | 20:21 | 89:2, 10, 12 |
| 57:7 71:18 | 21:2 49:6 | 37:8 44:7 | 23:20 24:3 | authoriz |
| 71:19 | 49:13,15 | argument | 26:5 49:19 | 70:14 |
| 94:18, 2 | 55:12 | 1:12 3:3 | 50:6,8,15 | authorize |
| 100:9 | 57:20 | 3:10, 17 | $51: 8,13$ | 69:13 |
| 102:15 | applican | $4: 2,95: 4$ | $52: 2153: 1$ | authorized |
| Anna 1:18 | 61:9,10 | 5:11, 13, 21 | $53: 1154: 7$ | 53:16 |
| 3:6 | applicati | $6: 3 \quad 12: 5$ | 54:15 | automobile |
| annually | 9:4 | 15:10 | 55:12 56:7 | 71:1 |
| 42:2 | applied | 16:10 17: | 57:17 | automobiles |
| answer $22: 2$ | 72:13 | 20:9 30:7 | 60:19 63:6 | 71:1 |
| 24:16 54:3 | applies 36:3 | $31: 1$ 33:3 | $63: 796: 6$ | available |
| 58:9,17 | 37:21 | 34:16,22 | 96:7 | 49:20 |
| 75:13 | apply $20: 3$ | 36:14,17 | ascertained | 50:14 51:8 |
| 91:16 97 | 72:4 | 37:7,7 | 19:17 | 52:20 |
| 104:14 | 107:18 | 38:13,17 | aside 22:8 | 54:15 |
| answering | appreciate | 44:4 45:12 | asked 19:1 | $55: 1256: 7$ |
| 101:7 | 74:11,18 | 45:22 | $44: 11$ 49:6 | 57:18 76:8 |
| anticipated | 109:7 | 48:12 50 | 51:19 62:2 | Avenue 1:14 |
| 25:1 | appreci | 50:9,18 | 75:2 97:9 | 2:8,13 |
| anticipa | 74:14 | $51: 1$ 52:11 | 103:3 | average 8:14 |
| 14:22 | approaching | 52:19 | asking 6:9 | avoid 15:11 |
| Apart 52:22 | 58:11 | 53:10, 14 | 27:7 51:18 | 84:22 |
| apparent | appropriate | 54:14 55:8 | 91:18 | aware 19:9 |
| 82:19 | 79:20 | 57:10,19 | 93:19 | 23:11 |
| apparently | approp | 60:19 | 104:13 | 24:12,15 |
| 21:21 | 24:4 | $64: 1166: 9$ | assertion | 44:1,5 |
| 61:16 87:5 | approv | 66:12 | 5:3 44:4 | awkward |
| appeal 1:5 | 72:5 | 67:10,18 | Assistant | 38:15 |
| 3:5,12 | 106:11 | 90:14 | 4:6 | a.m1:12 |
| 17:10 | approxim... | 93:16 96:2 | assume 47:7 | 109:15 |
| 27:12 | 1:12 8:21 | 107:22 | assuming |  |
| 43:10, 12 | 109:14 | 108:6 | 15:3 20:19 | B |
| 43:17 | April 18:18 | 109:8,9 | 37:5 90:2 | back 10:9,20 |
| 45:15 | arbitrary | arguments | 105:4 | 18:4 25:3 |
| $52: 11$ | 100:6 | 4:16. 22 | assumption | 32:15 |

Beta Court Reporting www.betareporting.com

| $35: 13 \quad 38: 6$ | 6:14,21 | bonanza | B(50) (iv) | 44: 4, 6 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 40:11 | $7: 6 \quad 45: 9$ | 102:9 | 87:11 | $46: 3 \quad 48: 5$ |
| 44:11 | 74:20 | book 43 : 22 |  | 49:13 |
| 71:17 | 79:18 | books 44:2 | C | $52: 10$ |
| 73:11 | believe | bottom 31 : 18 | C 3:1 108:14 | $53: 18$ |
| 101:21 | 13:22 14:2 | 55:20 | cabined | 55:10,15 |
| 102:17,20 | 19:18 | brand 71:4 | 40:15 | $55: 1657: 1$ |
| 107:11,19 | 27:11 | brand-new | call 81:14 | 57:3,19 |
| 108:7,17 | 34:16 46:4 | 25:1 | Cannon 88:6 | 60:2 70:14 |
| backdrop | $46: 1352: 3$ | breadth | 88:8,11 | $72: 14,14$ |
| 56:9 | $62: 5 \quad 65: 2$ | 24:18 | 103:13 | $72: 22 \quad 73: 1$ |
| BACT 7:18 | $67: 2 \quad 77: 9$ | Brian 2:7 | capacity | 73:5,5,15 |
| 11:9 19:20 | 97:10 | 6:19 | 104:14,17 | 73:16 |
| 28:11,15 | 99:11, | 108:10 | capricious | $76: 12 \quad 78: 8$ |
| 40:13,15 | 104:8 | brief 5:14 | 100:6 | 78:10,12 |
| 41:11, 20 | 107:3 | 5:17 6:5 | capture 10:3 | $78: 14,20$ |
| 42:2,6,15 | Beryllium | 9:13 12:7 | 99:2 | 102:13 |
| $44: 13 \quad 50: 7$ | 42:1 | 22:16 | carbon 7:18 | 105:5 |
| $56: 14 \quad 57: 7$ | best 31:9 | 30:22 | 8:7,9,18 | case-by |
| 71:12,16 | 64:10 76:8 | 31:12,19 | 9:8,10,15 | 71:19 |
| 71:18 | 98:13 | 35:2,19 | 9:22 10:3 | catchall |
| $72: 10 \quad 73: 7$ | better | 36:1 43:9 | 10:5,10 | 41:3.19 |
| $74: 3 \quad 77: 22$ | 106:19 | 46:4, 8, 10 | 11:8 13:11 | 67:19 |
| 80:16 | beyond 70:10 | $46: 12,18$ | 13:14 | 92:12,16 |
| 84:12, 22 | 104:14,16 | 48:14,16 | 15:22 | categories |
| 98:21 99:1 | bigger 32:12 | 50:3,16 | 18:12 28:7 | 41:18 67:5 |
| 100:20 | billion | 53:22 | 28:22 29:2 | 68:1 |
| 102:15 | 45:16 | $57: 21$ 65:5 | 29:5,11 | category |
| 106:21,2 | biomass | 66:22 | $32: 21$ 33:2 | $34: 4$ 37:1 |
| bar 53:19 | 10:19 | 76:18 | $33: 7 \quad 36: 5$ | 69:11 92:4 |
| based 8:15 | bit 48:12 | 87:19 95:6 | $42: 3,21$ | 93:1 |
| 22:19 | 55:3 87:18 | briefs 34:17 | 43:1 49:1 | 104:20 |
| 38:14 60:7 | Black's 82:7 | broad 21:5 | 49:3 55:22 | 105:7 |
| 76:7 | 82:8,17 | 34:7,12 | 57:5,6 | cause 11:18 |
| baseline | board 1:1 | 92:13 | 69:14 | $12: 2,5,11$ |
| 81:16 | 4:5,20 5:4 | broader | 101:16 | CCG 6:16 |
| basically | $5: 8,15,20$ | 65:16 | 103:18 | central 7:14 |
| 14:3 15:3 | 6:5 11:15 | broadly 8 | 106:13 | 101:2 |
| $38: 16$ 39:4 | 20:4 50:11 | brought | 107:10 | certain |
| 40:4 48:8 | 75:10 | 66:20 | cars 8:11,13 | 31:13 85:5 |
| $71: 18$ 87:9 | 79:12 97:4 | Bruce 2:12 | case 7:13 | certainly |
| 88:9 95:9 | 97:20 | $6: 137: 6$ | 11:3,13,16 | 46:21 |
| 103:9 | 99:13 | build 8:5 | 13:19,20 | $47: 13$ 60:7 |
| basis 61: 6 | 101:18,21 | 9:5 | 14:5,8 | $72: 16 \quad 73: 9$ |
| 70:20 | 102:5,10 | Building | 15:18 | 87:1 97:3 |
| bearing | 103:2 | 1:14 | 17:17 20:6 | 97:17 |
| 15:17 | 109:9 | built 10:9 | 21:7 22:1 | 104:16 |
| beginning | Board's 3:12 | 80:22 | 22:5 28:9 | CFR 56:9,18 |
| 6:12 | 4:1 11:12 | burden 19:16 | 28:19 35:4 | 108:15 |
| behalf $2: 2,6$ | 74:15 | 20:5,14,15 | $37: 1742: 3$ | 109:2 |

Beta Court Reporting www.betareporting.com
(800) 522-2382

| challenge | 48:20 | 77:6,20 | 108:1 | 57:22 58:2 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 9:11 | 107:17 | 82:18 86:1 | collateral | 58:7 61:22 |
| chance 31:20 | Circuit 16:5 | 86:22 93:7 | 5:18 13:15 | 62:2,3,14 |
| 51:16 52:1 | 48:21 | 94:4 | 47:5,11 | 102:8,10 |
| 52:5 54:10 | circumst | 107:12 | collegial | 102:18 |
| 61:4 | 14:17,19 | clearest | 61:6 | committee |
| change $21: 17$ | 16:1 20:2 | 93:9 94:7 | colloquy | 87:5 |
| 22:7 23:10 | 20:19 | clearly | 97:10 | common 68:19 |
| 23:21 25:2 | 59:14,17 | 16:17 | combined | commonsense |
| $26: 3 \quad 33: 6$ | 72:15 | 29:17 | 9:18 10:15 | 30:15 |
| $53: 2,9,12$ | circumst | $46: 22 \quad 53: 7$ | come 10:9,20 | comparable |
| $54: 5 \quad 65: 20$ | 11:19 | 80:15 | 16:22 92:8 | 32:8 |
| 83:12 | 12:14 | 88:12 96:6 | 104:8,9 | compelling |
| changed | 14:18 | 97:5 | 105:9 | 81:2 |
| 14:20 | 17:12 20:2 | CLERK 3 : 2 | comes 17:12 | complete |
| 20:13 21:8 | 22:6 | clients 60:7 | $52: 14$ | 32:10 |
| 21:13 | cite 31 | close 21:9 | 92:15 | comply 74:6 |
| 24:14 | cited 82:5 | 24:10 | coming 16:19 | conceivably |
| 26:13 | 83:8 | 25:19 | 27:17 | 14:18 |
| 56:11 | cites 36 | closed 23:13 | command 45:2 | concern |
| 89:19 | cities 62:9 | 23:14 | comment | 54:17 |
| 103:14 | claim 5:19 | 48:19 50:1 | 11:10 | concerned |
| changes | 46:17 | 50:5 | 12:21 19:1 | 51:21 55:4 |
| 52:17 | clarifi | Club 2 : 12 | 21:9 23:13 | 90:9 |
| changing | 87:19 | 3:16 4:3 | 24:6,10 | conclusion |
| 33:13,15 | clarity 28 | 5:1,2,14 | 25:14,19 | 20:13 |
| 48:6,7 | class 85:5 | $5: 18 \quad 6: 12$ | 46:19 | 40:19 47:1 |
| 50:12 | classifies | $6: 14$ 7:7 | 48:19 49:6 | 101:15 |
| character | 26:4 | $7: 17$ 11:7 | 50:1,4 | 102:3 |
| 80:21 | clean 9:17 | 11:21 | $53: 1$ 59: | confidence |
| charact | 28:10,18 | 12:18, 22 | 60:14 | 15:6 |
| 39:7 | 39:17 62:8 | $20: 7$ 36:7 | $61: 19 \quad 62: 3$ | confirm 19:5 |
| chemicals | 62:11 63:1 | 44:1, 6 | 96:5,11,13 | confirm |
| 40:13 | $69: 275: 16$ | 52:9,13 | 96:15 | 90:5 |
| Chevron 66:6 | 76:17,18 | 55:13,14 | 102:4 | confused |
| 76:13 77:3 | $76: 22$ 77:2 | 55:21 | commented | 53:1 |
| 77:10 | 80:3 86:3 | 56:13 | 47:8,9 | Congress |
| $79: 15$ | 88:20 89:2 | 63:17,18 | 55:14,16 | 28:9,18 |
| 100:1 | 108:2 | 65:5 | commenting | 29:3,22 |
| Chicago 2:4 | 109:1,3 | cluttere | 48:11 | 30:12,18 |
| chose 58:19 | cleaner | 51:15 | 57:12 59:9 | $42: 20 \quad 43: 7$ |
| Christian | 10:18 | coal 8:6,14 | comments | 44:19, 21 |
| 1:4 2:2 | clear 28:13 | 9:1 106:6 | 10:2 13:6 | 45:2 65:10 |
| 3:4,11,19 | 34:1 38:2 | 106:10 | $13: 8,9,18$ | 69:3,17,18 |
| 4:14,21 | 51:7,7 | coal-fired | 18:1,6 | 78:18 |
| 6:1,5,18 | 54:20,21 | 8:22 24:6 | $23: 6 \quad 27: 9$ | 81:20 82:6 |
| 8:4 10:8 | $55: 159: 5$ | codified | 38:18 39:4 | $82: 14$ 83:1 |
| $35: 19$ 45:9 | 59:11 | 76:22 77:2 | 40:1 47:8 | 83:12,13 |
| 45:13 | 63:11,12 | 86:4,15,19 | 47:12, 21 | $83: 20 \quad 84: 4$ |
| 46:15 | 66:7,15 | 87:8,15 | $55: 15$ 57:2 | 85:18 86:8 |

Beta Court Reporting www.betareporting.com
(800) 522-2382

| 86:10 | construc. | 44:12,17 | 49:2, 6, 15 | 56:14 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 100:12 | 25:5 45:16 | 58:9,13 | 50:3 54:12 | 61:14 62:6 |
| Congressman | 45:18 | 61:2 67:2 | 54:13 55:2 | $63: 1,3$ |
| 80:11 | $64: 20$ | 76:20 88:7 | 55:13 | 70:11,15 |
| Congress's | construed | correcting | 56:15 | 70:19 84:1 |
| 83:10 | 75:19 | 21:20 | 57:21 | 85:10,16 |
| connection | 81:22 | correctly | 60:21 | 85:19 |
| 47:10 | contacted | 42:10 | 62:20,22 | 86:12 88:1 |
| Conocoph. | 18:22 | 58:19 | $63: 21$ | 88:2,4,12 |
| 27:11 | contacting | Cossell | 70:10 78:8 | 88:18 89:5 |
| consequence | 22:14 | 77:18 79:6 | 79:14 | 89:8,8 |
| 9:5 51:11 | contempl | costly 45:17 | 88:10 95:7 | 96:11 97:8 |
| conseque... | 85:19 | costs 106:17 | 95:10,12 | 97:12 99:2 |
| 97:11,20 | context 7:13 | counsel 2:7 | 101:3 | 102:14 |
| 105:11 | 17:19 | 3:22 4:6 | 102:12,19 | 103:8 |
| 106:8 | 38:18 44:7 | 6:9,20 | 102:21 | 104:11 |
| 107:2,13 | 47:21 68:8 | 88:11,17 | court's | 105:21 |
| consider | 68:11 76:4 | 90:9 109:8 | 19:10 | 106:11,15 |
| 17:20 | 76:6 81:4 | counterp. | 63:16,18 | 107:4 |
| 20:12 57:6 | 81:8,12 | 74:2 | $78: 19$ | created 84:8 |
| 78:8 87:6 | 91:4 94:11 | country 25:6 | cover 83:17 | credit 81: 6 |
| 102:14 | 95:1 97:18 | County 1: 4 | covered | criteria |
| consider. | 98:10 | 2:2 3:4,11 | 40:13 | 89:12 |
| 13:12,14 | control 10:5 | 3:19 4:14 | 42:14 | crystall. |
| 25:11 | 30:2 65:8 | 4:21 6:1,5 | 77:22 84:7 | 54:19 |
| 46:21 96:1 | 65:12 | 6:18 8:5 | 85:20 | curious 32:2 |
| consider. | 75:22 76:8 | 10:8 35:19 | 86:13 | current |
| 79:19 | 91:8 | 45:10,14 | 87:10 | 51:17 |
| considered | 100:22 | 46:15 | 91:10,11 | 80:20 |
| 83:21 88:4 | 106:15 | 48:20 | 91:13 | currently |
| 97:1 | controlled | 107:17 | 92:18 93:3 | 9:2 32:4 |
| considering | 16:8 61:15 | couple 25:22 | 93:4 | 87:22 |
| 98:17 | 76:7 99:22 | 99:20 | covering | 91:19 |
| considers | controlling | 102:7 | 91:5 | 98:12,15 |
| 107:1 | 22:10 | course 8:15 | covers 40:8 | cut 106:3 |
| consistent | 56:10 82:9 | 11:5 31:3 | co-firing |  |
| 82:11 | controls 8:7 | 104:18 | 10:19 | D |
| 83:11 | 70:19 | court 7:16 | co-located | D 3: 1 |
| 90:20 | 106:11 | 13:19 14:8 | 10:14 | date 16:4 |
| 95:15 | Cooper 80:11 | 14:11,21 | co-locating | 22:18 37:2 |
| consiste | core 101:2,5 | 16:3 17:16 | 9:18 | 89:11 |
| 75:17 | correct | 17:17 | C02 19:20 | 103:12,22 |
| constitutes | 11:12 14:6 | 18:10 21:2 | 20:8 28:2 | day 20:4 |
| 24:2 | 19:8,11 | 21:2,3,15 | 29:18 30:7 | 89:15 |
| Constitu. | 21:19,22 | 22:8 24:21 | 32:7 33:5 | 101:9 |
| 1:14 | 23:3 26:17 | 25:18 27:7 | 33:21 34:1 | deal 46:9,11 |
| constrained | 36:22 | 27:8,14 | 37:8 41:13 | 46:12 |
| 79:13 | 37:11 40:9 | 35:4 38:3 | 43:5,14,16 | 54:10 |
| constructed | 42:16 | 45:11 | 44:7 49:18 | 84:19 |
| 8:8 | 43:18 44:8 | 48:21,21 | 50:6 54:2 | dealing |


| 15:12,14 | 82:21 89:4 | 98:20 | 29:11 | doctrine |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 15:19 | 90:17 | determined | $32: 22 \quad 33: 2$ | 52:4 |
| 17:20 | definitely | 20:5 26:15 | 33:7 36:5 | documents |
| 25:16 26:1 | 19:12 | 37:19 41:4 | 42:4,21 | 6:3 103:22 |
| 26:7,9 | definition | determines | 43:1 49:1 | doing 35:6 |
| 30:9 39:17 | 28:15 29:3 | 101:18 | $49: 3$ 55:22 | 45:1 79:4 |
| 44:10 | $30: 19 \quad 33: 1$ | detrimental | 57:5,6 | Doster 2:7 |
| 57:12 | $33: 15 \quad 34: 3$ | 45:21 | 69:14 | 6:19,20 |
| 58:18 | 34:7,9,11 | development | 101:16 | 74:12,13 |
| 59:17 69:1 | $35: 10 \quad 40: 3$ | 4:13 | 103:18 | $74: 17 \quad 75: 8$ |
| 72:16 | 40:21 | develop | 106:13 | $76: 14$ |
| 101:12 | 71:19 | 17:10 | 107:10 | $79: 16$ 81:3 |
| 105 | 80:16 82 | de-1isted | direct 39:9 | $81: 12 \quad 82: 2$ |
| deals 61:5 | 82:7,14 | 91:21 | directed | $83: 7 \quad 84: 3$ |
| dealt 47:1 | 83:8 86:5 | dictate | 24:5 | 85:7,12 |
| December | 100:18,20 | 70:19 | direction | 86:20 |
| 44:14 90: | definitive | dictating | 55:5 | $87: 16$ 88:7 |
| 104:10 | 39:14 | 74:3 | directions | 89:18, 21 |
| decide 72:1 | 96:20 | dictionary | 51:21 | $90: 1,8,19$ |
| decided 56:4 | degree 54:17 | 82: 4, 7, 8 | directly | 91:12,17 |
| decides | delay 45:17 | 82:17 83:8 | 75:2 84:3 | 92:14 93:9 |
| 57:16 | 45:20 | differ 95:19 | 96:16 | 93:17,19 |
| decision | deliber | different | disagreeing | $94: 1,6,21$ |
| 14:5,9,21 | 104:3 | 15:1 35:6 | 72:8 | $95: 22$ |
| 16:18, 20 | demonst | 63:12 | disagree | 97:19 98:2 |
| 16:21 | 102:2 | 66:21 | 104:11 | 98:12 |
| 17:18 | denied 6:6 | 80:21 83:9 | discretion | 99:16 |
| 18:21 19:3 | depart 60:9 | 87:18 | 41:13 | 100:10 |
| 20:8 22:15 | department | 88:21, | $42: 12,17$ | 103:11 |
| 24:21 | 8:21 98:11 | 91:15 | discuss 6:2 | 104:19 |
| 54:21 | depend 21:11 | 100:15 | 65:5 99:10 | 108:10 |
| $62: 16$ 63:2 | depth 99:10 | 103:18 | discussed | Doster's |
| 63:16,18 | describe | differently | 31:11 | 107:22 |
| 63:21 | 24:18 | 83:1 90:22 | 33:10 89:3 | dozen 106:10 |
| 78:20 | 75:20 | differs | discussion | 106:10,10 |
| 79:18 95: | Deseret | 95:22 | 32:22 43:2 | dozens |
| 95:10,12 | 27:11 62 | difficult | 47:6 | 106:12,12 |
| 101:21 | 62:15 | 17:5 49:14 | dispositive | draft 10:2 |
| 102:6 | $63: 15,20$ | difficulty | 81:3 | 19:2 48:19 |
| decision | 102:9,18 | 48:8 | dispute | dramatic |
| 79:13 | designed | diminut | 43:11,15 | 33:6 |
| decisions | 10:17 | 31:2 | 59:21 | dramatic |
| 18:12 54:5 | detail 48:15 | dioxide 7:18 | 104:6 | 9:21 |
| 55:2 | details 92:7 | 8:7,9,18 | disputes 5:2 | drastic |
| deem 87:6 | determin | 9:8,10,16 | dissenting | 99:13 |
| deference | 5:6 89:11 | 11:8 13:11 | 49:11,16 | Drive 2: 4 |
| $39: 11$ 66:6 | 105:2 | 13:14 | distinction | due 4:9 |
| $76: 13$ | determine | 15:22 | 29:13,14 | D. C $1: 2,8,15$ |
| define 21:12 | 54:12 | 18:12 28:7 | 29:15 | $2: 916: 4$ |
| defined 82:3 | 97:20 | 29:1,3,5 | docket 62:15 | 48:21 |

Beta Court Reporting www.betareporting.com

E1:18 $8^{\text {E }} 1: 1,1$
earlier
54:18
59:22
87: 22
88:22
96:21
early 18: 4 43:22

East 1:14
economic 107:5
economics 107:2
Ed 3:7
Edition 82:9 educated 60:5
EDWARD 1:18 effectively 36:17 37:6
efficiency 9:16, 21
Eighth 82:8
either 5: 6
9:2 10:11
37:8 93:22 106:16
emission
11:9 29:17 30:2 63:3 65:9,9,13 65:14 66:18 72:6 79:10 81:22 83:2 100:21,22
emissions 9:9,16, 22 13:12 29:1 62:11,19 75:22
80:20 89:9 93:14 105:21 106: 4 107:10
emit 8:8
emitted

| 26:11 89:5 | 32:13 |
| :---: | :---: |
| emphasize | 37:20 40:1 |
| 5:3 | 40:1,21 |
| emphatic | 41:12 |
| 18:11,14 | $42: 11 \quad 43: 9$ |
| encompass | 44:7 45:1 |
| 8:1 64:14 | $45: 13 \quad 46: 4$ |
| encouraging | 46:8,15,15 |
| 51:18 | 46:18 |
| Endangered | $48: 20 \quad 49: 7$ |
| 13:13 | $50: 10,20$ |
| energy 8:21 | 50:20 |
| 107:1 | 52:12,12 |
| enforcement | $53: 21$ |
| 39:9 | $55: 22$ 56:3 |
| enormous 9:9 | $56: 12 \quad 57: 4$ |
| 11:2 | 57:5,14 |
| 106:17 | 59:22 61:8 |
| ensure 28:13 | 62:5,10 |
| 81:5 | 69:13,14 |
| entering | 73:20 |
| 81: 13 | 75:11,16 |
| entity 50:11 | 78:13 |
| 50:21 | 82:12 |
| 60:17 | $83: 14$ 88:3 |
| enumerate | 88:17 89:6 |
| 92:22 | 96:8 97:1 |
| enunciated | 102:1,14 |
| 103:7 | 103:3 |
| enunciates | 107:16,17 |
| 101:15 | 107:20 |
| environm | 108:7,18 |
| 1:1,1,13 | 108:20,22 |
| 2:6,8 4:7 | 109:2 |
| 10:2 25:8 | EPA's 3:20 |
| 31:4 53:19 | 3:21 46:2 |
| 62:9 | 53:22 |
| 105:11,19 | 61:16 |
| 106:8 | 62:16 |
| 107:2 | 65:18 76:2 |
| envision | 77:12 |
| 14:17 | 83:11 |
| EPA 1:13 4:8 | 88:16 89:1 |
| 4:11,16 | 89:9,17 |
| 6:20 10:1 | equaled |
| 15:16,17 | 108:18 |
| 15:20 16:2 | equates |
| 16:9 21:21 | 73:16 |
| 28:19 30:4 | equivalent |
| 30:22 | 8:10 |

100:21
105:21
erroneous 47:1
error 76:19
ESQUIRE $2: 3$ $2: 7$
essence 39:8
essential 59:15
essentially 90:15
establish 18:15 $19: 20$ 29:17
established 14:22 $78: 18$ 84:13 99:7 establis... 41:10
establis... 63:3
ethanol 9:20
event 81:13
everybody 14:3
everybody's 47:18
evolution 90:3 104:1
exact 29:22 84:4
exactly 107:14
example 24:15 31:9 42:1 55:20 69:8 71:1
examples 75:17
exception 20:3 22:11 89:8
exclude 29:2 30:20 33:2 83:21 85:10
excluded

29:9 84:5
excluding
33:7 45:3
85:5
exclusively 32:18 44:19
exempt 44:15 exercise 89:11
exhaustive 31:15
exist 84:15 85:13
existed 77:14 88:3
existing 80:20
expand 78:22 84:1
expansive 79:4
expect 5:9
expecting 81:9
expensive 10:12
experience 8:16
expertise 99:9
explain 21:5 33:5 55:11 100:17 101:14
explanation 39:3 100:7 101:22
explicitly 29:4,9 $32: 16$ 35:6 44:21 83:2
express 45:11 74:13
extends 89:2 extensively 47:2
extent 16:10 93:2

Beta Court Reporting

| extraord. | federal 16:9 | 17:14 | fundamen. | 43:20 52:1 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 10:12 | 32:5 62:18 | followed | 53:9 | 54:10 61:4 |
|  | 89:16 | 82:12 86:5 | further 5:12 | 76:4 84:1 |
| F | 103:4 | following | 17:10 | 85:4 |
| Fabricant | feel 46:11 | 32:4 63:15 | 45:19 | giving 60:2 |
| 89:18 90:4 | 48:1 | 63:17 | 65:21 98:8 | global 9:12 |
| 103:8,20 | felt 82 : 15 | follows 3:15 | future 51:15 | 13:2,3,9 |
| face 65:16 | field 17:13 | footnote | 54:4 81:8 | 18:12 54:2 |
| 66:7 | figure 87:3 | 46:19 | 81:15 | 73:21 |
| facilities | filed 5:14 | force 80:14 | 106:16 | go 55:17 |
| 41:19 | 6:1 13:7 | 80:18 |  | $56: 8 \quad 61: 19$ |
| 105:7,16 | 18:1 57:3 | forcing 73:7 | G | 69:16 71:2 |
| facility | 62:9 | 73:12 | G 3:1 | 71:9,17 |
| 80:20, 22 | 102:17 | foremost | gas 54:2 | 102:11,13 |
| 99:3,4 | filing 45:15 | 76:16 | 62:11,18 | 102:15 |
| fact 5:3 | filled 71:4 | form 5:20 | 106:2 | 104:14 |
| 20:12 | final 22:1,4 | 40:5 47:6 | gases 62:7 | 107:6,11 |
| 21:15 | 22:6 24:11 | 59:19 69:7 | $62: 22$ | 108:7 |
| 22:15 23:1 | 32:14 79:7 | forth 79:6 | 88:19 | goes 38:3 |
| 23:4 26:19 | 79:12,18 | forward 30:4 | general 2:7 | 56:8 57:2 |
| 44:17 57:9 | 96:12,14 | found 16:5 | 3:22 6:20 | 69:20 |
| 65:6 76:18 | 103:1 | four 13:10 | 67:11 | 100:2 |
| 80:8 84:6 | 105:2 | fourth 34:4 | 72:11 | going 14:11 |
| 85:18 86:2 | Finally 5:22 | 104:20 | 88:11.17 | 16:20,22 |
| 86:18 89:6 | financing | framework | 90:9 | 17:18 25:3 |
| 90:16 | 45:18 | 15:15, 20 | 101:11 | 26:19 28:1 |
| 102:12 | find 17:4 | 18:2,3,7,8 | General's | $32: 19$ |
| 108:19 | 55:22 71:3 | 18:17 21:8 | 4:12 | 40:11 |
| factor 84:6 | fine 7:10 | 21:12 22:7 | Generation | 45:11 48:3 |
| facts 12:14 | firm 45:8 | 23:10 | 1:5 2:2 | 51:4,15 |
| 20:6 21:7 | first 7:16 | 24:13 | 3:4,11,19 | 60:6,9 |
| 22:10 48:7 | 12:1 38:7 | 26:12 28:8 | 4:15,21 | 61:16 72:5 |
| factual 48:7 | 45:10 | 33:6 51:17 | 6:1.18 | 73:11 75:3 |
| 60:16 | 59:10,16 | $57: 13$ | 35:19 | Gonzales |
| failed | 72:2 74:12 | 58:10,18 | 45:10 | 35:4 |
| 102:11 | 75:15 | 58:21 84:9 | 46:16 | good 3:9 |
| fair 19:22 | 76:16 | 84:17 | Generati. | 6:13,17,19 |
| 46:4 | 77:18,19 | 100:1 | 6:6 45:14 | 7:5 11:18 |
| fairly $90: 17$ | 95:5 108:6 | 102:20 | generic | 12:2,5,11 |
| familiar | 108:8 | free 48:1 | 30:15 | 20:9 45:4 |
| 48:18 84:4 | fit $92: 4$ | frequently | 67:20 | 45:7 109:9 |
| 92:7 | fits 92:12 | 24:6 | gentlemen | government |
| far 55:5 | five 32:18 | fuel 8:6 | 7:1 | 46:6 62:18 |
| 89:14 90:8 | 33:9,19 | fuels 9:17 | getting 48:9 | grafted |
| favor 14:12 | five-step | 10:18,18 | 101:5,14 | 56:18 |
| 56:16 | 107:1 | full 48:18 | give 7:12 | granted 6:5 |
| $\boldsymbol{f a x} 4$ : 6 | flagging | 62:13 | 31:20 52:4 | grapple 98:9 |
| February | 102:18 | 102:4 | given $20: 6,7$ | gratitude |
| 13:7 15:14 | flip 51:19 | fundamental | 24:5 38:22 | 45:11 |
| 15:19 57:3 | focused | 26:10 | 39:2,11 | great 84:19 |

Beta Court Reporting www.betareporting.com
(800) 522-2382
greater 28:4
40:20
greenhouse 54:2 62:7 62:11,18 62:22 88:19 106:2
ground 41:10
groups 62:9
guess 20:13 108:7
guesses 60:6 60:8
guidance 73:18.19 $74: 4$ 88:3 88:5 98:8 103:13 105:17

## H

H $2: 3$
half 13:8
handle 48:9
HAP 44:15
happen 10:16 52:5
happens 25:18 52:8
HAPS 83:21 84:5,6,16 91:21
hazardous 29:7,16 30:8 42:13 84:12
heard 104:19 108:6
hearing $3: 2$ 3:10 5:4 26:21 109:13,15
heat 9:18 10:15
held 49:12
help $10: 4$ 21:5 helpful 109:9

High 12 : 21 historic...

90:21
history $31: 3$
75:11
79:22 80:5
80:9 83:14
84:21
86:21
88:16
hoc 73:17
hold 11: 13
Honestly
108:20
Honor 17: 22
19:9 25:12
26:7 29:21
32:12
33:13,22
36:15
37:14 $47: 4$
49:5 55:10
57:16 60:4
70:7 71:21
99:19
104:4
108:5
Honorable
1:18,18,19
3:6
Honors 49:8
hoping 14 : 14
21:5
host $25: 4$
55:2
huge 106:17
hurdle 16:15
53:5
I
idea 24:1.
identical
4:17
identified 32:16
identify 13:10 91:9
92:3 93:5
107:5
IEPA 4:20
$18: 5 \quad 34: 17$
48:20
50:10 60:2
IGCC 99:4
ignore 18:14
ii56:1 77:3
$77: 10 \quad 78: 3$
$79: 15$
90:16
91:11
92:11, 17
92:18, 22
93:3 104:7
104:22
108:13
iii 90:16
91:11
92:12
Illinois 2:4
4:7,8,11
4:11,16
8:6,11
$15: 16,16$
15:20 16:8
16:12 19:1
30:22
37:10
38:14,15
38:17,19
38:22
39:15,20
39:20
$45: 13 \quad 46: 2$
46:10,15
46:18
50:20
52:12. 12
$57: 5 \quad 59: 22$
61:7,17
67:8,18
73:9 90:13
107:16
imagine 26:8
immediately
37:21 75:3
85:19
92:14
impact 10:2
impacts 5:18
13:15 47:6

47:11
implemented 43:5
implicat...
73:21
98:17
99:12
implicit 33:3
important
11:5 69:4
impossible 10:20
include 32:7
34:12
81:22 88:1
$88: 2 \quad 89: 4$
92:17
includes
36:18
including
9:17 10:8
10:18
13:12
50:11 80:2
95:17
108:11
inconsis...
48:6
incorpor... 40:2 87:2
increase 9:9
9:16
increased 4:18
increases 9:21
increments 78:19
independent 12:5
indicate
$31: 13 \quad 39: 2$ 39:6
indicated 7:17 104:9 106:21
indicates 31:14
indication

30:13,17
$33: 14 \quad 80: 4$
$85: 17 \quad 86: 1$
86:9 96:13
96:15
100:14,16
individual
$73: 17 \quad 74: 2$
98:10
105:16
industrial 9:19 10:14
industry
35:15 78:12,14
ineffective 45:14
infeasible
10:11
106:16
inform 83:14
initials
105:22
initiative
74:16 106:3
insignif...
25:11 26:9 105:12
insist 60:2
insofar
53:22
instance 72:2
instances 77:15
instructive 88:16
integration 86:10
intended
29:2 30:1
34:8 73:7
80:7 81:21
83:11
86:12 87:1
intending
65:10
intent 80:10
80:15

Beta Court Reporting

| 81:17 | interpre... | 54:20 55:1 | J | 67:7,10,13 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 83:10 | 39:12 | 56:14 | JAMES 2:3 | 67:16 68:1 |
| 84:21 | $75: 11$ | 57:12,14 | January | 68:5,10,14 |
| 85:17 86:2 | 83:15 | 59:11,18 | 12:20 | $68: 20 \quad 69: 6$ |
| 86:21 | 108:9 | 59:21 | 15:13,19 | 69:10,15 |
| intents | interprets | 60:16 | Jim 6:17 | 70:1,8 |
| 10:20 | 94:4 | 62:19 63:9 | 45:8 | 71:9,12,22 |
| interested | intervening | 63:19 64:5 | Judge 3:9 | $72: 8 \quad 73: 6$ |
| 20:21 | 21:17 | $65: 19$ | 6:15 7:1 | 73:10,13 |
| 26:21 | 24:14 | 70:10 | $7: 10 \quad 11: 22$ | 74:7,11 |
| 97:13 | 26:14 | 71:13,14 | 12:9,12,16 | 75:4 76:9 |
| interesting | intimately | $74: 22 \quad 77: 3$ | 13:17 14:2 | 79:11 |
| 11:22 | 12:19 | 77:10,19 | 14:7,16 | 80:17 |
| 35:18 | inventory | 78:9 87:3 | 16:7,16 | 81:11,19 |
| interim | 31:8 | 88:17 94:8 | 18:19 | 83:4,20 |
| 105:8,12 | invoke 80:8 | 94:9 95:13 | 19:12,15 | 85:3,8 |
| internal | 80:15 | 96:1,4,6,7 | 20:17 | 86:17 87:9 |
| 104:3 | involved | 96:16 97:4 | 21:11,20 | 87:17 |
| internat | 12:19 28:4 | 98:14 99:3 | 22:13 | 89:14, 20 |
| 81:14 | involving | 102:19 | 23:17,18 | 89:22 90:2 |
| interpret | 27:10 | 107:12,13 | 24:17 26:3 | 90:11 91:9 |
| 83:17 | irrespec | issued 18:22 | 26:15,18 | 91:16 |
| 101:8 | 16:12 | 22:5 23:15 | 27:2 29:12 | 92:10 93:6 |
| interpre. | issuance | $32: 14$ 37:3 | $30: 6 \quad 31: 10$ | 93:15,18 |
| 21:16 23:3 | 21:10 | 37:20 | $32: 13308$ | 93:22 94:2 |
| 37:13 | 24:11 | 77:19 86:7 | $33: 17$ | 94:13 |
| 39:14 | 25:19 | 90:4 | 34:15 | 95:18 |
| 40:12 41:6 | issue 5:19 | issuer 52:1 | 35:17 | 96:20 97:9 |
| 44:12 | 11:6,8,20 | 52:4 54:9 | 36:16 37:4 | 97:22 98:4. |
| 64:12 76:3 | 12:18 13:4 | 60:6,8 | 37:12,15 | 99:15 |
| 76:12 | 15:3,11 | 61:3,6 | 38:12 40:4 | 100:3 |
| 77:12,13 | 16:4, 8, 17 | 74:5 | 40:10 41:8 | 103:9,21 |
| 78:7,11,21 | 16:17 | issues 4:10 | $42: 743: 8$ | 104:5,6,21 |
| 78:22 79:1 | 17:14,18 | 4:22 5:5,7 | 43:15,20 | 105:4 |
| 79:5,21,21 | 19:16 20:8 | 5:10 7:14 | 44:9 45:4 | 106:21 |
| 80:2 82:12 | 20:20 21:3 | 11:4,13,17 | 47:13,17 | 107:21 |
| 83:12 88:9 | 22:3 23:14 | 15:4 18:13 | 49:11,17 | 109:4,7 |
| 89:17,19 | 25:15 27:4 | 19:13 | 50:22 | judges 3:6 |
| 90:7,20 | 27:5,13,16 | 32:17,19 | 51:10 52:8 | 75:5 |
| 93:8,10,11 | 27:17,21 | 33:9,20 | 52:22 54:3 | judicial |
| 93:21 94:1 | 32:13 33:8 | 47:14 | 54:16,17 | 54:5 |
| 94:3,7,19 | 38:21 40:9 | 56:16 | $57: 8 \quad 58: 3$ | July 49:22 |
| 95:2,14 | $40: 11$ | 58:12 | $58: 659: 6$ | 62:1,5 |
| 97:7 99:22 | $42: 10$ | $74: 19$ | 60:13 | 63:21 |
| 100:5 | 43:14,16 | 98:16,18 | 61:20 |  |
| 101:20 | 46:8 47:19 | 98:21 | $62: 21 \quad 64: 1$ | K |
| 103:14 | 47:22 | 109:10 | 64:4,7,10 | Kathie 1:19 |
| interpreted | 48:22 49:2 | iv 8:1 28:20 | 64:19 65:4 | 3:7 |
| 90:15 | 50:7 51:20 | 91:11 | 65:22 66:2 | key 39:18 |
| 108:22 | $53: 20$ | i.e 44:6 | 66:10,15 | kicking |


| 59:18 | large 8:5 | 59:2 | 96:12,20 | 57:14 92:6 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Jnnew 16:18 | largest | length 39:5 | 103:3 | looks 74:5 |
| 16:19 29:4 | 26:10 | lengthy | listed 33:11 | lot 6:8 |
| know 7:3 | lastly 9:22 | 24:20 | 33:18,21 | lower 21:3 |
| 17:6,7 | law 6:21 | letter 6:2 | 87:22 |  |
| 45:13 | 11:16 | 56:21 | 96:18 | M |
| 48:11 | 21:18 | let's 56:8 | listing 32:6 | MACT $84.9,9$ |
| 50:13 | 22:10 23:4 | 69:8 | lists 31:12 | 85:1,14 |
| 52:16 59:4 | 23:7,21 | level 40:20 | 96:22 | Madison 2:13 |
| 65:20 | 26:3 39:15 | 41:4,5,13 | litany 75:17 | magnitude |
| 79:17 | 45:8 47:1 | 43:3 49:13 | literally | 24:13 |
| 80:18 | 56:11 82:7 | 57:20 74:4 | 25:22 | major 41:15 |
| 81:15 85:9 | 82:8,17 | levels 40:18 | litigants | 41:16 |
| 85:17 93:5 | laws 28:21 | 41:1 | 70:19 74:3 | majority |
| 99:8,11 | 39:13 | liability | litigated | 49:9 |
| 104:14 | 1ay 9:13 | 70:20 | 61:12 | making 15:10 |
| knowing 17:8 | 102:12 | 1iberty 99:9 | litigation | 17:6 33:6 |
| knowledge | laying 101:6 | light 19:3 | 49:16 | 40:2 57:18 |
| 43:19 | Layman 4: 6 | 34:19 | 55:13 | 57:20 |
| knows 52:10 | lays 12:7 | 90:16 | 61:15 71:7 | mandate |
|  | 41:1 100:8 | 102:1,1 | 1ittle 38:15 | 84:14 |
| L | 106:22 | 1imit 7:19 | 48:12,15 | manifested |
| L 1:18 2:7 | 1eap 72 :21 | 42:3, 6 | 55:3 72:14 | 103:19 |
| labels 71:5 | leaps 92:10 | 65:3 71:16 | 80:21 | manual 71:2 |
| 71:6 | leave 27:6 | limitation | 87:18 | Mass 44:7 |
| lack 52:19 | left 17:13 | 30:2 66:13 | LLC 1:5 | 102:1 |
| 102:1 | legal 4:10 | 66:18 | LLP 2 : 3 | 107:20 |
| laid11:15 | 7:14 11:4 | 93:14 | localized | Massachu. |
| 18:7 99:20 | 14:19 | limitations | 70:20 | 13:20 |
| 100:1 | 15:15 18:3 | 29:17 65:9 | located | 15:17 |
| landscape | 19:4,19 | 65:14 72:7 | 10:13 | 18:16, 21 |
| 20:12 | 20:15 21:3 | $82: 183: 2$ | logic 94:17 | 19:3 22:14 |
| language | 21:8,12 | limited | long 61:7 | 49:7 52:10 |
| 18:14 | 22:7 23:10 | 11:19 37:7 | longer 5:19 | 52:14,17 |
| 28:11,16 | 24:13 | 78:16 | 23:3,6 | 52:18 53:2 |
| 31:12,17 | 26:12,12 | limiting | 66:22 95:8 | $53: 8,13,15$ |
| 31:18 32:8 | 36:20 | 32:18 | long-sta. | 53:21 56:3 |
| 32:9 34:5 | 51:17 | limits 11:9 | 76:2 | 57:19 |
| 34:13,18 | 59:11 | 63:3 68:22 | long-time | 59:13 |
| 35:3,8 | 60:15 62:6 | line 55:20 | 106:22 | 69:13 70:2 |
| 38:5 53:4 | 71:15 | linked 67:20 | 1ook 31:3,16 | matter 1:3 |
| 64:21, 22 | 88:18 | list 31:15 | 34:2,17,19 | 1:11 3:11 |
| 65:1 66:3 | 102:3 | 32:10 | 35:4,10 | 7:15 11:11 |
| 66:9,12,14 | legally | 33:11,18 | 48:16 50:2 | 19:19 21:1 |
| 68:16 | 29:14 | 34:1 77:21 | 82:6 92:2 | 60:14 |
| 73:15 79:4 | 44:16 | 77:22 | looked 38:6 | 64:11 |
| 80:17 81:1 | legislative | 87:21 88:2 | looking 8:4 | 71:15 |
| 86:6 96:21 | 80:5,9 | 91:4,6 | 22:22 | 97: 14,15 |
| 100:8 | 84:21 | 92:1,2, 6 | 24:22 25:2 | 106:14,18 |
| 101: 6, 13 | legitimate | 92:16 96:8 | 31:17 | 108:22 |

Beta Court Reporting

| 109:11 | $95: 9,16,19$ | $76: 18$ | 33:1 | 37:11,14 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MC-2344A $2: 9$ | 95:21 | misunder | narrowly | 37:16 |
| mean 16:18 | 101:1,2,4 | 21:21 | 81:22 | $39: 16$ 40:7 |
| 17:4 20:22 | 101:12 | mobile 70:15 | 90:15 | 40:21 |
| 21:1,4,12 | 103:8,13 | 78:3 92:18 | nature 91:22 | 41:12 |
| $21: 17$ 30:1 | 103:20 | moment 46:5 | NAX 78:1 | 42:16 |
| 30:14 | mention | 99:1 | necessarily | 43:12,18 |
| 33:17 | $32: 2135: 1$ | monitor 65:3 | 50:17,18 | 44:5,19 |
| 35:15,15 | 101:13 | monitoring | 58:8,16 | $45: 5 \quad 48: 12$ |
| 36:16 | mentioned | 28:21 | necessary | 51:20 57:9 |
| $37: 19$ | 20:18 | 29:19 | 82: 15, 20 | 58:13 |
| 51:13 | 26:18 | 30:20 31:5 | 82:22 | 81:20 |
| $54: 20 \quad 65: 2$ | 90:13 | 37:9 43:21 | need 17:20 | 99:17,19 |
| $68: 14 \quad 69: 8$ | 108:11 | 64:14,17 | 23:22 | 103:15 |
| 69:17,19 | mentioni | 64:18 65:2 | 34:18 | 104:2,16 |
| 72:20 | 12:2 | 69:7 77:4 | 69:12 74:5 | 105:18 |
| $76: 10$ | Mercury 89:5 | 83:18 | needed 71:16 | 108:5 |
| 94:12 95 | mere 45:15 | month 13:7 | 83:17 | 109:5,6 |
| 95:12, 20 | merely 24 : 22 | months 26:1 | needing 59:8 | NISHAP 78:2 |
| 97:16 98:5 | merits 15:4 | 103:7,19 | neither 49:9 | nonsensical |
| 98:6 | $46: 1747: 2$ | moot 54:14 | never 18:22 | 68:3,6 |
| 100:11 | 48:5 70:17 | morning $3: 9$ | 77:2 78:4 | non-regu |
| 101:9 | 75:2,8 | 3:10 5:12 | new 8: 11,22 | 57:7 |
| 104:12 | message 61:1 | $6: 13,17,19$ | 41:15 | normally |
| meaning 8:1 | mid 43:22 | 7:6,12 | 62: 19 | 39:12 |
| 8:3 28:14 | Midwest $2: 12$ | 45:7 | 65:19 | northeast |
| 30:3,4 | 105:20 | morning's | $72: 22$ 84:8 | 105:22 |
| 77:7 83:10 | 106:7 | 5:21 | Nilles $2: 12$ | 106:5 |
| 100:21 | million 8:9 | motor 62: 19 | $6: 13,14,16$ | notable |
| 108:3 | 8:17 106:4 | move 27:3 | $7: 2,5,6,11$ | 92:16 |
| meaningful | 106:7 | 75:3 | 12:7,10,13 | note 4:19 |
| $100: 8$ | mil1ions | moving 10:7 | 12:17 | 5:12, 22 |
| means 30:5 | 42:5 |  | $13: 22$ 14:6 | 35:22 |
| $35: 21$ 37:6 | 106:13 | N | 14:13 | 37:16 38:3 |
| 50:5 51:22 | mind 47:11 | N3:1 | 15:13 | 49:9 77:1 |
| 67:4 95:3 | 92:11,15 | NAAQS 108:12 | 16:14 | 85:10 |
| 98:10 | minimize | name 45:8 | 17:22 19:8 | 107:16 |
| 100:15 | 9:15 13:3 | names 6:10 | 19:14,18 | noted 4:18 |
| 108:10 | minimizes | narrow 12:14 | 20:17 21:7 | 10:1 |
| meant 30:14 | 9:22 | 20:2,18 | 21:19, 22 | notes 40:1 |
| 30:18 33:5 | minimum | 21:6 22:3 | 23:8 24:9 | notice 89:16 |
| $78: 6$ 82:16 | 101:17, 20 | 22:11 24:9 | $25: 12$ 26:6 | 103: 4 |
| 82:17 | 102:14 | 25:17, 20 | 26:17 27:1 | noticed 27:8 |
| 100:17 | minute 58:1 | 30:18 | 27:6 29:21 | notified 4:5 |
| measures | $61: 14$ | 92:13 | 30:11 | notion $24: 18$ |
| 106:1 | minutes 3:17 | 94:19 | 31:22 | 30:15 |
| memo 88:6,8 | $3: 18,20$ | narrower | 32:12 | 68:21 |
| 88:11,15 | 4:1,18 7:8 | 34:20 | 33:12, 22 | notwiths |
| $89: 18 \quad 90: 4$ | 99:17 | 78:10 | $35: 1$ 36:13 | 17:15 |
| 94:9,15,18 | mistaken | narrowing | 36:22 | 103:10 |

Beta Court Reporting
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| NSBS 67:14 | okay 7:9,10 | original | 76:17 85:1 | permit 1: 6 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| NSPS 78:2 | 19:14 | 55:21 86:5 | 85:3 109:1 | 3:4,12 |
| 92:7 | 23:17 27:1 | 86:6 | 109:2 | 12:19 13:5 |
| 108:12 | 27:2,4 | origins 87:4 | participate | 18:22 19:2 |
| NSR $34: 3$ | $31: 22$ 32:2 | ought 61:3 | 4:9 | 19:13 |
| 40:14 | 37:15 | outcome | particular | 20:11 21:3 |
| $42: 14$ 43:6 | 47:16 69:9 | 14:14 | 59:14 | 21:10 22:1 |
| 44:7,13 | $74: 7$ 75:8 | outset 7:7 | 72:15 | 22:4,6 |
| 73:18 80:8 | 91:14 | overall | 97:18 99:3 | 23:14,15 |
| 83:21 85:6 | 104:5 | 72:20 81:4 | particul.. | 24:11,19 |
| 85:11 87:2 | omissions | overarching | 9:17 | 25:20 27:8 |
| 97:8 | 65:8 | 48:4 | parties 28:4 | 27:10,12 |
| nuisance | once 41:20 | overcome | 46:6,14 | 27:22,22 |
| 39:8 | 104:7 | 16:15 | 55:21 | 37:3 38:21 |
| number 98:14 | onus 23:9 | overruled | 62:16 | 45:14 47:9 |
| 98:17,20 | open 16:17 | 95:10 | 104:7 | 48:20 |
| NW 1:14 2:8 | opened 23:22 | overview | party $49: 13$ | 49:21 |
|  | opening 27:9 | 7:12 | 49:15 | 51:14,14 |
| 0 | operating | owners 71:2 | 55:14 56:5 | 52:1,4 |
| 03:1 | 18:9 | oxygen 65:1 | passed 86:8 | 54:9 56:15 |
| OAR/OGC 46:4 | operative | 65:3 | patchwork | 59:19 60:6 |
| obligation | 90:7 |  | 70:18 | 60:8 61:3 |
| 19:4,19 | opinion 49:7 | P | 72:10 | 61: 6, 8, 10 |
| 51:3 62:6 | 49:12,16 | P 3:1 | pattern 17:9 | 63:4,19 |
| 88:18 | 49:17 | Pacifist | PDS $1: 5$ | 74:5 |
| obtains | opinions | 67:13 | pending | permits |
| 49:16 | 49:9 | page 35:22 | 16:17 25:5 | 23:18 24:1 |
| obviously | opportunity | 48:17 | 102:10 | 24:7 25:5 |
| 14:13 27:7 | 12:13 | 55:19 56:8 | Pennsylv... | 25:13 |
| 28:3 29:4 | 59:10 60:3 | 57:2 62:14 | 2:8 | permitted |
| 39:19 | 74:18 | 63:14,15 | people 55:5 | 8:19 42:1 |
| 41:12 | 83:19 | 63:17 | 87:6 | permittee |
| 95:20 | 102:3 | 87:19 | percent 10:4 | 36:2 61:5 |
| 103:15 | opposed | 96:22 | perform | 61:5,8 |
| 109:1,11 | 69:18 70:3 | pages 13:7 | 71:18 | permitting |
| occurred | opposite | papers 93:12 | period 11:10 | 9:2 10:7 |
| 50:4 | 49:12 57:1 | paragraph | 12:21 19:2 | 15:21 |
| October 1:9 | 57:22 58:5 | 48:18 | 21:9 24:10 | 20:10 |
| 3:14 4:8 | 58:7 61:1 | 62:14 | 24:14 | 27:20 36:8 |
| 5:14,16 | 61:22 63:8 | parallel | 25:19 | 59:12,16 |
| 6:1 8:20 | oral 1:12 | 30:8 | 26:14 | 60:16 |
| offer 10:4 | 3:3,10 | parlance | 48:19 50:1 | 71:17 72:1 |
| 30:12 | order 3:12 | 101:11 | 50:5 61:7 | 97:15 98:5 |
| office 2:7 | 5:15 6:4 | parroting | 90:3 105:8 | 98:7 |
| 2:12 3:20 | 6:11 41:16 | 35:3 | 105:12 | 105:13,15 |
| 3:21 4:12 | ordered | parsing | permissible | person 17:6 |
| 6:20,21,22 | 28:19 | 101:6 | 76:4,10 | 98:13 |
| 20:1 74:20 | 42:20 | part 5:11,17 | $77: 13$ | perspective |
| 90:8 | ordinary | 5:20 6:6,7 | permission | 11:1 25:10 |
| Oh 65:22 | 7:22 71:12 | 18:4 47:6 | 6:2 62:3 | 27:19 81:9 |

Beta Court Reporting
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| 98:5 | plants 8:16 | 27:18 | 78:2,2,3 | 105:20 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 105:13 | 8:22 9:1,6 | 46:21 | 78:17,18 | 106:1,6 |
| petition 5:1 | 10:6 24:7 | 73:22 | 79:9 83:22 | practical |
| 23:15 | 29:1 | 79:22 | 84:12 85:5 | 21:1 25:9 |
| 66:21 | 105:20 | pollutant | 85:6 88:1 | 51:10,16 |
| petitioned | 106:6,6,10 | 15:6,8 | 88:19 89:3 | 97:11,16 |
| 55:22 | plant's | 16:3,15 | 91:7,10,19 | 97:19 |
| petitioner | 10:12 | 22:20 | 91:21 92:1 | 106:14,17 |
| 7:7 46:20 | pleading | 26:11,13 | 92:18 93:1 | 107:13 |
| 46:22 47:7 | 54:6 | 26:16,21 | 96:9,18 | 108:22 |
| 48:10 | please 3:8 | 28:7,12 | 97:1 103:4 | practica. |
| 49:12 56:4 | 7:2 61:20 | 29:8,16 | 107:8 | 105:15 |
| 60:11 96:2 | 64:9 | 33:2,16 | 108:11,12 | practice |
| petitioners | pleasure | 34:4, 6, 10 | portion 67:3 | 77:16 |
| 16:6 78:12 | 74:17 | 34:11,18 | position | preamble 6:8 |
| 78:15 79:2 | pled 54:6 | 35:16 | 16:2 17:1 | 33:4 96:12 |
| 91:2 99:14 | plug 107:4 | 37:22 40:8 | 17:16 22:9 | 96:15 |
| petition. | PM 78:17 | 40:14,14 | 23:7 25:2 | 103:2 |
| 6:4 59:1 | point 9:7 | 41:2,21 | 42:9,11 | preambular |
| 68:17 | 14:3 20:11 | 42:15,19 | 44:1 62:17 | 95:20 |
| phrase 41:3 | 23:2,5,16 | 43:6 44:3 | 68:15 | precede |
| 64:13 | 26:22 | 44:8 49:1 | positively | 34:20 |
| 75:19 76:5 | 27:18 | 49:4,18 | 51:1 | precedent |
| 77:9 80:16 | 30:11 36:1 | 53:6,17 | possibility | 77:16 |
| 83:5 | 36:8 41:14 | 56:1 57:7 | 14:11,14 | prefaced |
| phrased 70:8 | 42:22 43:1 | 69:18 70:4 | 15:7 16:21 | 31:14 |
| pick 104:21 | 48:15 54:8 | 70:11 76:1 | possible | prefatory |
| picks 39:19 | 55:15 58:1 | 87: 1, 12 | 76:12 | 96:21 |
| picture | 59:5 63:13 | 88:4,13 | post 44:6 | premise |
| 14:20 | 65:20 68:3 | 93:2 94:20 | posture 14:4 | 94:18 95:4 |
| 53:12 | 69:21 | 95:1, 3, 4 | post-Mas | 95:6,8,11 |
| pieces 48:14 | $70: 17 \quad 71: 5$ | 97:8,12 | 94:16 | premises |
| pipeline | 71:5,6 | 101:4,16 | potential | 94:22 |
| 28:1 | 72:3,21 | 102:16,22 | 77:11 | prepared |
| place 10:13 | 81:20 | 103:8 | 92:20 93:1 | 27:3 74:21 |
| 18:3,17 | 83:22,22 | 104:12 | potentially | prescribe |
| 35:9 41:7 | 93:7 100:3 | 108:13 | 24:1 25:4 | 30:18 |
| 59:16 97:6 | 101:1 | pollutants | 25:22 | PRESENT 2 : 11 |
| 100:16 | 103: 1, 6 | 29:9,15,18 | 65:16 | presented |
| 102:20 | 105:3 | 30:9 31:13 | pounds 42:2 | 12:15 |
| 107:15,18 | 108:18 | 32:4,6 | 42:4 | $35: 13$ |
| plain 64:22 | pointed | 33:10,18 | power 8:5,16 | 37:17 |
| 65:1 66:3 | 95:21 | 36:3,10,19 | 8:22,22 | 109:10 |
| 66:9,12,14 | 96:21 | 37:2 41:15 | 9:6,15,18 | preserva. |
| 68:16 | pointing | 42:12,17 | 9:19 10:6 | 15:11 |
| planning 9:3 | 25:9 | 44:13,15 | 10:12,15 | preserved |
| plant 8:6,8 | points 56:17 | 44:17, 22 | 24:6 29:1 | 5:1,7,11 |
| 8:14 9:15 | 99:20 | 45:3 62:7 | 35:12, 20 | reserving |
| 9:19,20 | 102:7 | 75:20 | 36:2 37:17 | 55:7 |
| 106:1 | policy 10:22 | 77:21 78:1 | 78:8 | presiding |

Beta Court Reporting www.betareporting.com

| 3:7 | 49:21 | properly 5 : 8 | 77:19 | 22:21 23:1 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| presumably | 56:15 | 39:6 | 78:19 | 24:4 26:10 |
| 71:22 91:1 | 60:22 61:1 | proposal | 81:10 | 27:16 28:6 |
| pretext | proceedings | 96:9 | 85:20 | 35:14,17 |
| 52:18 | 11:15 | proposed 8:8 | 100:19 | $37: 18$ 38:6 |
| pretty 55:1 | 15:21 | 9:1 32:15 | 103:5 | 38:13 42:8 |
| prevailing | 23:22 | 39:22 | 108:8 | 43:5 44:9 |
| 22:9 97:6 | 24:19, 20 | 105:20 | PSD-dele. | 44:11 47:4 |
| prevails | 27:22 | 106:6 | 27:19 | 51:19 54:4 |
| 61:17 | 51:14 | proposing | public 10:22 | 57:16 |
| previously | 63:20 | 8:5 9:7 | 11:9 12:21 | 60:14 66:5 |
| 4:18 54:14 | process 9:3 | proposition | 13:6 23:12 | 69:16 70:2 |
| primarily | 9:4,20 | 35:20 36:3 | 25:14 | 70:4,12 |
| 4:19 | 10:7,14 | prospect | 47:12 | 75:9,13 |
| primary 8:6 | 12:19 | 54:1 | 102:4 | 77:7 78:4 |
| principal | 23:13 | protection | published | 78:9 85:2 |
| 75:14 | 25:14 59:1 | 1:1,1,13 | 96:8 | 90:12 |
| principles | 71:13 | 2:6,8 4:7 | 103:12 | 91:14, 22 |
| 64:20 | 72:11 | 31:4 | pull 31:20 | 94:11 97:9 |
| prior 15:21 | 73:18,19 | provide | purely 72 : 17 | 99:21 |
| 18:17 44:3 | 82:9 | 102:3 | 73:16 | 101:5,8,19 |
| 44:6 50:3 | 106:21,22 | provided | purport 83:9 | 104:13 |
| $52: 19$ | 107:1,4,7 | 89:13 | purpose | 105:6 |
| 55:16 | product | providing | 36:12 | questions |
| 59:13 67:5 | 70:20 | 13:18 | 37:22 52:3 | 13:1 43:8 |
| 84:15,16 | program | provision | 59:6 | 75:1,6 |
| 105:8 | 28:11 | 38:1,19,22 | purposes | 99:8 103:3 |
| prioritize | 29:10 | 39:5,8,16 | 10:20 | quick 7:12 |
| 42:12 | 33:13 | 39:20,21 | 33:19 | 99:20 |
| Probably | 34:13 | 67:20 | 38:10 | 102:7 |
| 60:18 | 41:17 | 68:12 69:7 | 40:14 | quickly $7: 13$ |
| problem | $72: 16 \quad 73: 2$ | 75:21 | 42:15 | quilt 70:18 |
| 10:21 11:1 | 81:10 | 86:14 87:8 | 49:20 55:7 | quite 51:21 |
| 61:9 | 85:20 87:2 | 87:15 | 59:7 | 88:21 |
| procedure | 100:20 | 89:13 | pursuant | quote 38:5 |
| 19:9 | programs | provisions | 3:12 | 80:10 |
| procedures | 72:13.18 | 34:19 92:8 | push 55:5,10 | 88:14 |
| 23:12 | 73:3 | PSD 3:5,11 | put 30:4 | quoted 31:18 |
| proceed 3 : 14 | prohibition | 27:12 | 69:3,6 |  |
| 7:2 32:3 | 39:7 | 28:10 29:3 | 85:9 96:16 | R |
| 38:12 | project 8:4 | 29:10 32:5 | 99:5 | R3:1 |
| proceeding | 45:17 | 33:13 | putting 22:8 | Radiation |
| 7:19 13:5 | 102:9 | 34:13 36:3 |  | 3:21 6:21 |
| 18:2 21:4 | projects | 36:11 38:7 | $Q$ | 6:22 74:20 |
| 22:18 | 106:14 | 38:11 | qualifies | rain 8:1 |
| 24:12 | promulgated | 40:22 | 40:6 | 16:11 |
| 27:10 | 92:17 | 41:17 | question 5:9 | 28:21 |
| 36:14 37:1 | promulga... | 44:22 | 7:18 15:5 | 29:18 37:9 |
| 37:5 45:20 | 89:15 | 48:20 | 19:21 | 43:21 |
| 45:22 47:9 | proper 37:12 | 72:16 73:1 | 20:16 22:2 | 64:14,16 |


| raise 7: 18 | really 14:21 | recall 38:17 | referenced | $43: 6 \quad 44: 3$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 11:8,19,21 | 19:13 23:6 | receive | 33:9 | 44:8,18 |
| 12:18 13:4 | 38:6 48:10 | 56:19 | references | 49:18 |
| 16:6 43:13 | $75: 980: 22$ | received | 47:12 | $52: 13 \quad 60: 1$ |
| $50: 15$ 51:3 | 85:22 | 50:10,19 | referred | 63:1 67:6 |
| 51:9 52:11 | 93:19 | $51: 1 \quad 52: 6$ | 79:8 87:21 | 67:15 |
| $56: 3,14,20$ | 99:10 | 96:10 | 102:8 | 68:19, 22 |
| $56: 22$ 59:8 | 101:6 | recognition | 104:21 | $69: 22$ |
| 75:6 | reason 49:5 | 97:5 | referring | $86: 22$ |
| raised 4:22 | 59:7 107:9 | recognize | 22:11 67:7 | 87:22 |
| 11:14 13:1 | reasonable | 14:10 | refers 93:12 | $88: 13 \quad 89: 7$ |
| 19:22 20:8 | 50:5 56:2 | 22:16 | reflect 5:5 | 96:10,19 |
| 43:16,19 | 56:13,20 | recognized | reflected | 104:12 |
| 46:20, 22 | 59:2 60:8 | 27:17 | 23:6 | 108:14 |
| 52:2 54:14 | 75:13 | 92:20 | reflects | regulatees |
| 59:21 | $77: 14 \quad 78: 7$ | recognizing | 86:20 | 28:5 |
| 60:15 | 93:21 | 14:7,8 | reg 50:13 | regulates |
| $63: 20 \quad 96: 2$ | 100:5 | recommend | 51:6,7 | 65:1 |
| 97:4 | reasonably | 101:20 | regard 65:4 | regulating |
| 107:13,15 | 11:17 12:3 | reconcile | regardless | $54: 2 \quad 56: 11$ |
| 107:19 | 12:8 17:21 | 32:11 | 19:20 | 57:5 80:22 |
| raising | 19:17 | reconsider | 41:22 | regulation |
| 25:14 | 20:20 | 19:2 | regional | 7:21, 22 |
| 27:12 | $23: 19$ 24:3 | record 6:10 | 106:2 | 16:8 28:8 |
| 63:19 | 26:5 49:19 | 18:20 19:6 | regions 98:6 | 28:13,16 |
| ramifica | 49:20 50:6 | 46:13 | Register | 30:5,10,13 |
| 25:8 | $50: 8,14,14$ | 76:20 | 89:16 | 30:16,19 |
| rate 98:19 | $51: 7,8,12$ | 96:14 | 103:4 | 34:2,7,14 |
| rationale | 52:20,20 | 100:7 | Regrettably | 35:14, 21 |
| 85:12 | 52:22 | 102:2,4 | 4:5 | 36:18 |
| reach 15:4 | $53: 10 \quad 54: 7$ | recordke | regs $16: 9$ | 37:19, 20 |
| reached | $54: 8$ 56:6 | 28:22 | 56:22 | 39:10,18 |
| 102:2 | 56:7 57:17 | 30:21 | regulate | 39:19, 21 |
| reaching | 57:18 59:8 | reducing | 36:21 | $39: 22 \quad 40: 3$ |
| 79:18 | 59:11 | 80:19 | $53: 16 \quad 56: 1$ | 40:5,8,16 |
| reacting | $60: 19 \quad 63: 6$ | reduction | $62: 6,10,18$ | 40:22 41:2 |
| 23:5 | 63:7 | 106:1 | 69:14 | 41:22 42:9 |
| read 66:4,17 | reasoned | reductions | 70:15 | 42:20,21 |
| 67:1 68:8 | 39:3 102:5 | 80:14,19 | 88:18 | 44:2,14 |
| 68:10 | reasoning | 81:6,15,16 | 89:10 | 53:4 59:4 |
| 88:14, 22 | 95:9 | redundancy | regulated | 60:10 |
| 90:21 | reasons | 84:22 | 26:13, 20 | 63:10,11 |
| readily $82: 1$ | 45:18,18 | 85:14 | $32: 4$ 33:1 | 64:13,15 |
| 82:2 | 45:19 | redundant | $33: 15 \quad 34: 4$ | 64:21 |
| reading 48:4 | 75:14 84:4 | 84:11 | 34:9,11. | 65:15,18 |
| 68:12 | rebuttal | refer 35:20 | 35:16, 22 | 65:21 |
| ready 64: 6 | 3:18 4:4 | 63:14 | 36:4,6,11 | 66:16,19 |
| real 53:17 | 7:4,9 | reference | $36: 19 \quad 37: 2$ | 67:1, 4, 19 |
| realize 24:3 | 58:14 | 47:14 48:1 | 37:8,22 | 69:8,19, 21 |
| 104:13 | 99:18 | 88:5 | 38:8,9,10 | 70:3,12 |


| $71: 872: 22$ | regulatory | rejected | request 4:1 | 52:1,5 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 73:20,21 | 40:12 | 78:20 | 6:6 74:15 | 59:10 61:4 |
| 75:12,19 | 75:21 89:1 | related | requested | 105:14 |
| $76: 677: 8$ | 94:3 97:13 | 60:13 87:7 | 74:21 | responded |
| $77: 978: 5$ | Reich 1:18 | relative | requesting | 59:13 |
| $78: 16 \quad 79: 8$ | 3:7,9 6:15 | 47:14 | 6:2 | Respondents |
| $80: 16$ 81:7 | 7:1,10 | release 31:8 | requixe 63:2 | 11:7 |
| 81:10, 21 | 11:22 12:9 | relevance | 84:12 | response |
| 82:3, 8, 15 | 12:12,16 | 47:22 55:3 | required | 4:13 39:4 |
| $82: 21$ 83:6 | 13:17 14:2 | relevant | 28:12 | 46:2,3 |
| 83:15,17 | 14:7,16 | 33:19 54:9 | 41:21 | 62: 4 |
| 85:6,11 | 16:7,16 | 55:7 | requirement | restrict |
| $86: 6$ 87:13 | 18:19 | remains | 29:19,20 | 34:9 |
| 87:14 | 19:12 | 95:15 | $37: 10 \quad 76: 7$ | restriction |
| 90:22 91:3 | 21:11, 20 | remand 27:8 | 77:5 84:10 | 82:10 |
| 91:20 | 22:13 | remandate | 85:15,16 | result 81:7 |
| 92:21 93:8 | 23:17 27:2 | 101:21 | 91:8 | 85:20 |
| 94:12 95:3 | 29:12 30:6 | remember | requirem. | retrofit |
| 95:5,12 | $31: 10$ 32:1 | 12:2 39:3 | 29:6,7,8 | 10:10 |
| 97:2,6,7 | 33:8,17 | rendered | 30:21 31:5 | reverse |
| 98:3 | 35:17 | 68:3,5 | $31: 572: 6$ | 75:10 |
| 100:10,11 | $36: 16$ 37:4 | reopen 19:1 | 83:18 | reverses |
| 100:13,13 | 37:12,15 | 20:11 23:9 | requires | 21:2 |
| 100:15,19 | $38: 12$ 40:4 | reopened | 75:22 | review 5:1 |
| 101:9,17 | 45:4 47:13 | 21:4 | requiring | 11:6 32:6 |
| 108:2,3,10 | 47:17 | repeatedly | 28:21 | 38:20 |
| regulations | 50:22 | 75:16 | researched | 66:21 79:7 |
| 8:2 13:13 | 52:22 | reply 5:14 | 87:3 | 99:8 |
| 16:9,13 | 54:16 57:8 | 5:17 6:4 | reservation | 102:13 |
| 28:20 | 58:3,6 | 9:13 12:7 | 46:17 | reviewed |
| 29:16 31:2 | $61: 20 \quad 64: 1$ | 22:16 | reserve 3:17 | 16:4 |
| 31:2,6 | 64:4 65:4 | $31: 12 \quad 35: 2$ | 4:4 7:8 | reviewing |
| 32:13,14 | $65: 22$ 66:2 | $36: 1$ 48:14 | reserved | 50:11,20 |
| $35: 7$ 36:7 | $66: 10 \quad 70: 1$ | $48: 16 \quad 50: 3$ | 46:19 | revoluti. |
| 38:7 41:7 | $70: 873: 6$ | 50:16 | reserving | 53:21 |
| 43:21 | 73:10,13 | 57:20 65:5 | 7:3 | RGGIs 105:22 |
| 56:12 | $74: 7,11$ | 66:22 | resolution | Rhein 31:11 |
| 64:17 | 75:4 76:9 | report 8:20 | 28:3 | right 7:17 |
| 65:12 | 80:17 | reporting | resolved | 9:3 10:13 |
| 70:22 | 81:11 87:9 | 28:22 | 17:15 43:7 | 12:9 15:12 |
| 73:12 | 87:17 | 30:20 31:4 | 56:16 | 16:16 27:6 |
| 77:19 94:5 | 89:14, 22 | represent | respect | 27:10 |
| 101:7 | 90:2 96:21 | 6:11 | 76:14,15 | 55:17 56:9 |
| 104:8 | 99:15 | represen | 94:8 | 58:17 69:5 |
| 105:9 | 103:9,21 | 4:10 | respectf | $72: 7 \quad 79: 21$ |
| 108:8,15 | 104:5 | 103:11 | 60:5 | $80: 14$ |
| 108:17,19 | 109:4,7 | represen | respects | 87:16 |
| 109:3 | reinforces | 48:8 | 4:17 | 97:22 |
| regulators | 57:9 | represented | respond | 98:16 |
| 28:5 | reject 62:17 | 3:21 | $34: 21$ 39:1 | rigorous |


| 107:7 | 69:5,9,12 | 44:15, 21 | 67:4 96:13 | single-s... |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ripe 71: 14 | $69: 20 \quad 70: 6$ | 56:12 69:2 | 96:15 | 13:8 |
| rise 3:2 | 70:13 | 76:16, 21 | side 51:19 | SIP 37:10 |
| risk-based | 71:11,20 | 77:1,4 | Sierra 2:12 | 38:14,17 |
| 84:17 | $72: 373: 4$ | $80: 684: 2$ | 3:16 4:3 | 38:19,22 |
| Robb 4:6 | 73:8,11,14 | 84:8 85:9 | 4:22 5:2 | 39:20,21 |
| robustness | 74:8,9 | 85:21 | $5: 14,17$ | 40:2 72:4 |
| 106:20 | 88:22 | 86:11,13 | 6:12,14 | 72:5 |
| Room 2:9 | 97:11 | 87:11 | 7:7,17 | site 74:3,3 |
| rubric $12: 10$ | 102:8 | 94:10 96:3 | 11:7,21 | situated |
| rule 14:12 |  | 96:16 | 12:17,22 | 52:9 |
| 79:7 82:10 | S | 108:1,4 | 20:7 36:7 | situation |
| 92:3 | S 3:1 | see 17:11 | 44:1,6 | 15:18 |
| ruled 48:22 | safety 71:1 | 18:19 | 52:9,13 | 79:15 |
| 49:2 51:4 | saw 80:17 | 29:13 | 55:13,14 | sixth 55:20 |
| rulemaking | saying 12:4 | 31:17 32: | 55:21 | slice 25:21 |
| 32:17 | 19:4 48:10 | $39: 974: 1$ | 56:13 | solely 58:20 |
| 43:10 | 57:22 58:4 | 92:2,3 | 63:16,18 | solve 9:11 |
| 44:10 | 58:7 66:3 | seen $84: 20$ | 65:5 | $10: 21$ |
| 77:17 | $66: 16$ 70:1 | sense 11:2 | signal | 61:11 |
| 87:21 96:5 | $72: 10 \quad 83: 4$ | 24:19 66:9 | 103:16 | somewhat |
| 96:11, 22 | 87:10 | 68:17,19 | signifi | 79:3 |
| rules 11:12 | 103:10 | 69:1 74:1 | 18:10 | sooner 28:2 |
| 11:16 | 105:1,10 | 77:3 91:13 | 40:22 | 106:18 |
| 19:10 | 108:18 | 105:1 | 41:13 43:3 | sorxy 70:6 |
| 83:16 | says $32: 3$ | 107:5 | 53:17,18 | $73: 15$ 85:1 |
| ruling 18:10 | 46:8,10 | sentence | 86:18 96:4 | 88:20 |
| 21:6 25:18 | 50:13 | 50:2 | 98:19 | 89:21 |
| 47:5 49:17 | 52:12 61:8 | 102:11 | 105:19 | sort 33:3 |
| 49:22 50:4 | $68: 973: 5$ | separate | significant | 40:11 |
| 102:21 | 87:11 | 69:16 | 16:21 | 51: 18, 18 |
| run 75:18 | 108:13 | September | 25:17 | 72:21,22 |
| Russell $2: 3$ | scheduling | 3:13 | 29:14 | 105:6,8 |
| 6:17,18 | 5:13 | sequestr | 40:17,19 | sought 62:17 |
| 45: 6, 7, 8 | School 12:22 | 98:22 99:6 | 41:1, 4, 5 | source 26:11 |
| 47:16 48:2 | science 13:9 | serious | 46:20 | 41:16 |
| 51: 6, 22 | scope 37:18 | 18:13 | 99:12 | $70: 19 \quad 78: 3$ |
| 52:16 | 89:9 | session $3: 3$ | similar 8:16 | sources |
| $53: 15$ 55:9 | scoured | set 41:13 | similarly | 41:15 |
| $57: 15 \quad 58: 4$ | 96:14 | 43:2 71:16 | 42:5 52:9 | 70:15 81:5 |
| $58: 22 \quad 60: 4$ | seated 3:8 | 79:6 | simple 9:14 | 92:19 |
| 60:18 | second 62:13 | sets 17:9 | 28:9 41:6 | 98:20 |
| $61: 21 \quad 64: 3$ | $76: 2$ 85:1 | setting | 75:10 | so-called |
| $64: 6,9,16$ | 85:3 95:4 | 13:13 | 99:21 | 46:16 |
| 64:22 | 95:11 | Seven 106:5 | 107:3 | 67:19 |
| 65:17 66:1 | secondly | share 54:16 | simply 10:16 | S02 78:17 |
| 66:8,11,19 | 7:20 56:22 | shortly | 35:2 71:17 | 89:5 |
| 67:9,12,14 | Section 7:22 | 27:18 | 100:6 | speak 40:18 |
| $67: 22 \quad 68: 2$ | 28:14 29:8 | show 19:16 | single 9:6 | 41:8 74:19 |
| 68:7,13,15 | $29: 936: 6$ | shows 46:14 | 94:6 | 81:19 |


| 98:14 | start 47:3,3 | 43:15,20 | 35:14,21 | successful |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 104:17 | starts 43:9 | 44:9 51:10 | 36:10,18 | 31:6 |
| 107:21 | state 6:9 | 52:8 59:6 | 37:18 38:9 | sudden $99: 12$ |
| 108:20 | 18:15 | 62:21 68:5 | 38:20 39:8 | suddenly |
| speaking | 22:14 98:7 | 68:10,14 | 39:18 | 24:21 25:3 |
| 64:19 | stated 37:19 | 68:20 69:6 | 40:15 41:2 | 55:6 98:8 |
| Species | 88:12,17 | 69:10,15 | 41:17,21 | sufficie... |
| 13:13 | 93:11 95:6 | 71:9,12,22 | 42:9,20 | 69:4 87:7 |
| specific | statement | 72:8 79:11 | 44:22 53:4 | suggested |
| 13:10 30:3 | 10:3 49:8 | 83:20 85:3 | 64:12, 21 | 79:22 |
| $32: 18$ | 80:11 94:4 | 85:8 86:17 | 65:11,15 | suggesting |
| 34:21 35:8 | 94:7 95:19 | 89:20 | 65:18,21 | 30:7 47:17 |
| 65:6 84:20 | statements | 90:11 91:9 | 66:16,18 | 50:22 51:2 |
| 89:12 91:8 | 48:6 | 91:16 | 66:19 67:1 | 53:11 |
| 91:22 94:9 | states 1:1 | 92:10 | 67:4,19 | 58:15 70:9 |
| 96:1 | 9:2 27:20 | 95:18 97:9 | 70:3,12 | 76:11 |
| specific... | 31:7 38:8 | 97:22 98:4 | 75:12,19 | 79:12,17 |
| 22:2 28:19 | 39:12 62:8 | 104:6,21 | 75:20 76:5 | suggestive |
| 69:3 80:9 | 81:6 | 105:4 | 77:8 78:15 | 80:19 |
| 90:17 | 105:22 | 106:21 | 79:8,9 | suggests |
| specifics | 106:5 | Stein's 54:3 | 80:15 | 19:7 32:9 |
| 67:21 | stating | 54:17 | 81:21 83:6 | suite 2:13 |
| specified | 62:10 | step 45:1 | 83:15 86:6 | 29:6 |
| 67:21 | stationary | 100:2 | 87:12,14 | suites 62:10 |
| specify | 70:18 | 107:6 | 90:22 91:3 | summary $46: 2$ |
| 82:16 83:1 | status $13: 18$ | stood 76:3 | 91:7.20 | 48:17 |
| speculate | 26:12 54:6 | storage 10:3 | 92:21 93:8 | 55:19 |
| 84:10 | statute 30:1 | story 63:5 | 93:13,13 | 63:13 |
| spirit 56:21 | 35:3,5 | 63:12 | 94:5,12 | support $46: 1$ |
| sponsors | 42:19 69:3 | straight | 95:3,5,11 | 46:3 53:22 |
| 80:7,12 | 71:7 73:5 | 101:19 | 97:2,7 | supported |
| 81:18 | 76:5 101:7 | Strawn 2:3 | 98:2 | 17:1 77:15 |
| spontaneous | statutory | 45:9 | 101:17 | suppose 60:5 |
| $73: 17$ | 28:8 34:5 | stretched | 103:5 | supposed |
| square 25:4 | 34:12 | 68:18,22 | 108:3,9,19 | 60:12 |
| staff 12:22 | 35:11 38:4 | strict 20:15 | subjected | Supreme |
| 98:15 | 39:7 40:12 | strike 63:14 | 42:6 | 13:19 14:8 |
| standard | 45:2 56:10 | strong | subjective | 14:11 |
| 30:2 79:10 | 64:11,20 | 103:16 | 60:10 | 17:16,17 |
| 84:9 | 73:15 | strongly | subsequent | 18:10 |
| 100:22 | 75:21 | 46:11 | 63:19 | 21:15 22:8 |
| standards | 93:20 94:2 | studying | substance | 25:18 35:4 |
| 65:10,14 | 99:22 | 98:16 | 27:4,5 | 50:3 54:13 |
| standing | 101:19 | Subchapter | 64:4 | 56:15 |
| 16:6 18:15 | Stein 1:19 | 108:14 | substances | 57:21 |
| 46:7 48:5 | 3:7 20:17 | subject 7:21 | 67:15 89:7 | 62:20, 21 |
| 53:20 63:9 | 23:18 | 16:7 28:7 | subsumed | 63:16,18 |
| 70:14 | 24:17 26:3 | 28:12,16 | 69:11 | 63:21 88:9 |
| standpoint | 26:15,18 | 29:15 32:5 | success | 95:7,10,12 |
| 79:22 | 34:15 43:8 | 34:6,14 | 51:17 | 101:3 |

Beta Court Reporting www.betareporting.com

| 102:12,19 | Taylorville | text 95:20 | 91:17 | 25:14 41:7 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 102:21 | 12:21 | thank 6:15 | 96:10 | 46:1 47:5 |
| sure 20:4,14 | technical | $7: 1,5$ 45:4 | three 6:3 | $65: 21 \quad 75: 9$ |
| 21:14 27:3 | 11:11 | 45:21 48:2 | 26:1 34:19 | 75:18 91:3 |
| 36:9 42:8 | 60:16 | 74:7,10 | 46:5,14 | 101:15 |
| 48:17 64:1 | technolo | 99:15,19 | 56:17 | 107:9,15 |
| 68:11 70:9 | 107:6 | 109:4,6 | 59:19 | 107:19 |
| 81:1 98:13 | technology | Thanks 90:1 | $66: 2167: 5$ | 109:3 |
| surely 79:11 | 41:11 73:7 | theories | 67:21 | today's 11:5 |
| surmise | $73: 12 \quad 76: 7$ | 48:7 | 106:10 | 36:13 37:1 |
| 84:19 | 76:8 84:13 | theory $23: 19$ | time 3:18 | 37:5 |
| 85:13 | 99:1,7 | thing 92:15 | $4: 4,14 \quad 7: 3$ | told 21:16 |
| surprisi | technolo | things 9:14 | 9:10 12:1 | tons 8:9,17 |
| $5: 2$ | 72:18 | 43:4 44:13 | 13:17 21:2 | 41:18 42:5 |
| susceptible | 85:15 | $53: 9 \quad 72: 12$ | 25:21 | 106:4,7,13 |
| 72:19 | tens 106:1 | 77:22 87:4 | 47:19 | top 63:17 |
| sweeping | term 7:21 | 91:5,6,22 | 57:11 61:7 | tossed 101:3 |
| 18:11 | 29:22 | think 12:1 | $64: 2 \quad 70: 16$ | touch 105:18 |
| swept $18: 16$ | 64:13 | 15:9 17:2 | $73: 14$ | toxic 31:8 |
|  | 65:13 | 17:5,19 | $74: 10 \quad 76: 4$ | translated |
| T | 69:17,19 | 19:22 23:4 | 78:1,5,19 | 26:20 |
| tack 103:18 | $75: 11$ 77:8 | 24:12 | 79:5,10 | treating |
| take 48:13 | 82:3,14 | $25: 10 \quad 33: 9$ | 80:2 81:18 | 97:12 |
| $68: 16$ 69:8 | 83:15 | 42:13 | $84: 1985: 8$ | tried 87:3 |
| 109:11 | 94:19 95:1 | 44:20 | 85:18 | tries 30:22 |
| taken 16:2 | 101:10 | 47:20 | $86: 14 \quad 88: 3$ | trigger |
| 17:17 44:1 | terminology | 54:18,19 | 88:10 | 104:19 |
| 84:18 | 65:6 | $55: 1 \quad 56: 21$ | 90:22 | troubled |
| takes $35: 12$ | terms 22:13 | 61:2,9 | 96:20 97:2 | 24:17 |
| 52:13 68:7 | 41:10 | 73:1,16 | 104:10,12 | troubling |
| 72:11 | $42: 17 \quad 43: 4$ | 82: 6, 20 | 105:9 | 56:5 |
| talk 13:9 | $53: 7$ 54:21 | $83: 10 \quad 84: 5$ | 108:6 | true 50:17 |
| 26:19 33:5 | 54:22 | 86:20 | times 17:7 | 50:18 |
| $39: 461: 14$ | 59:11 67:5 | 88:15 92:5 | timing 105:6 | try 10:9 |
| $64: 17 \quad 65: 8$ | $88: 16$ | 92:15 | Title 8:1 | trying 67:17 |
| $65: 966: 2$ | 90:17 | 98:11 | 28:20 | turn 7:13 |
| 102:15 | 93:10 94:6 | 108:10 | 34:10, 12 | turning 11:4 |
| talked 33:20 | 97:15,16 | 109:8 | 56:1 67:14 | 11:6 28:6 |
| 100:10 | 100:15 | thinking | $78: 3$ 92:17 | two 7:14 |
| 103:2 | 101:3 | 91:15 | $92: 18,22$ | 15:4 43:8 |
| talking 24:7 | 106:20 | 104:1 | 93:3,4 | 46:6 62:9 |
| 25:3 40:16 | test 11:15 | third 48:18 | 95:2 | 75:14 |
| 47:19 65:7 | 15:1 25:1 | Thirteen | 101:12 | $78: 16$ |
| 87:20 | 50:12 76:3 | 28:17 | 104:7,22 | 83:22 |
| 106:12 | testified | thought | 108:13,14 | 94:21 |
| tangential | 13:1 | 16:12 | toady 78:9 | 105:19 |
| 55:4 | testimony | 22:15 51:4 | today $9: 3$ | 106:6,10 |
| Tatel 49:17 | 18:1 | 58:8,10,16 | 12:15 | type 37:21 |
| Tatel's | testing | $58: 17 \quad 59: 1$ | 15:16 22:3 | - |
| $49: 11$ | 56:18 | 59:4 69:4 | 22:12 | $\cdots$ |

Beta Court Reporting
(202) 464-2400 www.betareporting.com
(800) 522-2382

| ubiquitous | 102:16,22 | view 21: 14 | $51: 1$ 58:15 | 45:9 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 48:6 | unresolved | 24:2 26:4 | $82: 22$ | Wisconsin |
| Uh-huh $12: 12$ | 4:10 | $41: 9 \quad 44: 16$ | 86:19 | 2:13 |
| 12:16 | unsucces | $48: 22 \quad 49: 3$ | 108:1 | withdrawing |
| 66:10 | 84:18 | 51:12 | waste 47:18 | 36:17 |
| 73:10,13 | untrue 49:8 | 61:17,17 | way 5: 6 | withdrew |
| 81:11 | updating | $70: 17 \quad 78: 6$ | 16:22 | 5:18 |
| ultimately | 86:3 | 86:17 | 31:16 | Wolgast 1:18 |
| 58:9 86:19 | upfront 7:3 | 90:18 | 49:22 53:3 | 3:6 19:15 |
| 88:10 | 11:1 | 97:14 | 53:7 54:11 | 94:13 |
| unclear 54:4 | upheld 78:21 | 103:5,6 | 62:13 | 100:3 |
| uncover 84:1 | urge 27:14 | 104:18 | 65:19 66:4 | 107:21 |
| understand | use 4:3 9:17 | viewed 30:8 | 70:8 79:14 | WOLQAST |
| 15:7 30:6 | 10:15,17 | views 65:18 | ways $13: 3,10$ | 40:10 41:8 |
| 36:9 42:8 | 66:9,11,14 | 97:14 | 66:21 67:2 | $42: 7$ 60:13 |
| 42:10 | 68:4 | vitality | Webster's | $64: 7,10,19$ |
| 49:14 | uses 18:15 | 94:15 | 82: 4 | $66: 15 \quad 67: 7$ |
| 53:10 | 28:15 | volunteer | Wednesday | 67:10,13 |
| 67:16 | usual 30:15 | 12:22 | 1:9 | $67: 16$ 68:1 |
| 72:20 | U.S2:8 |  | weeks 25:22 | 81:19 83:4 |
| 89:15 | $39: 22 \quad 46: 4$ | W | Wegman 94:9 | 93:6,15,18 |
| 91:14 | 46:8,14 | Wacker 2: 4 | 94:15,17 | 93:22 94:2 |
| 94:17 | $53: 22 \quad 57: 4$ | wait 10:8 | $95: 18,21$ | wondering |
| understa | $61: 16$ | waiting 14:4 | 101:1 | 32:11 |
| 20:22 | $62: 16$ | 14:9 106:9 | weighing | 94:14 |
| 43:13 | 65:17 | waive 7:17 | 27:15 | word 7:20 |
| 53:13 | 69:13 | waiver 11: 6 | went 40:1 | 30:13 |
| $54: 22$ 90:5 | $73: 20$ | 27:16 46:8 | 70:10 | 39:18 68:4 |
| 90:10 |  | $52: 3$ 74:22 | weren't | 100:9,12 |
| 109:10 | V | 75:6 | 33:19 | words 71:13 |
| understands | v 34: 10,12 | 107:12 | West 2:4,13 | 98:1 105:7 |
| 4:20 | 95:2 | want 19:5 | we'113:14 | work 41: 10 |
| understood | 101:12 | 36:8 47:18 | we're 3:9 | 107:4 |
| 57:13 91:3 | 102:1 | $72: 974: 13$ | 15:12 18:9 | working |
| 91:4 96:19 | 107:20 | 90:5 94:13 | 22:11 26:6 | 73:19,20 |
| unequivocal | vacuum 8:19 | 107:11,16 | 26:7,9 | 106:1,3 |
| 104:22 | variety | wanted 60:20 | 27:3,7 | world $21: 14$ |
| unequivo. . . | 72:11 | $63: 14$ | 39:17 | worth 15:10 |
| 11:14 38:8 | various 92:8 | 90:11 | 40:16 | worthwhile |
| unique 20:1 | vehicle 71:3 | warming 9:12 | 59:17 69:1 | 17:2 |
| United 1:1 | vehicles | 13:2, 3,10 | 105:5 | worthy 59:3 |
| 9:1 31:7 | 62 : 19 | 18:13 | 106:11 | wouldn't |
| 81:5 | versus 49:7 | warning 71:4 | we've 73:8 | 16:11 |
| universe | $53: 2156: 3$ | 71:6 | 80:1 95:6 | 50:19 52:6 |
| 36:10 | 69:13 | Washington | 105:7 | 71:9,16 |
| 42:14 | VI 67:14 | 1:2,8,15 | 108:6 | 85:13,14 |
| 44:12 | viable 50:7 | 2:9,13 | wholly 14:22 | wrestling |
| unregulated | 50:9,18 | wasn't 19:13 | window 24:9 | 9:11 27:21 |
| 22:20 | $56: 19 \quad 59: 3$ | 22:1,21 | 25:17 | writing |
| 91:19 | 95:8 98:22 | 25:1 32:16 | Winston $2: 3$ | 86:14 |

Beta Court Reporting

| written 47:8 | 1235:22 | 1991 29:5 | 3 | 8023931:18 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 57:2 83:16 | 62:8 | $199356: 11$ | 355:19 | 8024032:3 |
| wrong $21: 16$ | 12th 4:8 | 89:19 94:9 | 303:20 4:18 | 82136:6 |
| 58:14 | 12002:8 | 108:20 | 31:8 77:14 | 56:12 69:2 |
| 88:20 | 12011:14 | $199632: 15$ | 82:13 | 76:16,21 |
|  | 122 2:13 | 32:17 96:8 | 95:16 | $77: 4$ 80:6 |
| $\mathbf{x}$ | 124 19:10 | 199888:8 | 30-year | 84:2 85:9 |
| $\mathbf{x} 1: 3,7$ | 56:19 |  | 75:11 | 85:21 |
|  | 124.1356:9 | 2 | 3144 :14 | 94:10 96:3 |
| $\mathbf{Y}$ | 1357:3 | 218:18 | 3122:5 | 96:16 |
| yeah 97:22 | 83:14 | 48:17 | 352 :4 | 100:14 |
| year 8:10,11 | 14 62:8 | 62:14 |  | 108:1,15 |
| 18:4 57:4 | $153: 14 \quad 6: 1$ | 20 4:1 | 4 | 108:20 |
| 58:1 62:1 | 49:22 | 20-page | 48:9 44:20 | 830 2:13 |
| 106:4 | 165:16 | 49:17 | 56:8 63:14 |  |
| years 8:12 | 1657:22 | 2008:17 | 69:11 | 9 |
| 8:14,15,18 | 86:11,13 | $200231: 11$ | 403:16 | 95:14 |
| 18:8 24:20 | 100:13 | 32:13,20 | 56:18 | 90 8:22 10:4 |
| 25:21 | 101:13 | 34:3 35:7 | 108:14 | 27:21 |
| 28:17 31:8 | 108:4 | 43:10 | 41277:1 | 76:21 80:6 |
| 77:14 | 165 (a) (2) | 44:10,14 |  | 90s 43:22 |
| 82:13 | 13:16 | 87:20 | 5 |  |
| 83:14 | 169 28:14 | $89: 16$ 90:6 | $563: 15$ |  |
| 95:16 | $171: 913: 7$ | 90:12 92:3 | 87:19 |  |
| Z | 80:13 | 92:22 | 508:12,15 |  |
| $\text { zero } 24: 16$ | 95:17 | 95:19 96:4 | 8:18 |  |
| $40: 20 \quad 41: 5$ | 197728:9 | 96:22 | 5221 40:22 |  |
|  | 30:16 35:9 | 103:1 | 87:11 94:3 |  |
| \$ | $75: 15$ $82: 19$ | $200389: 20$ $89: 21,22$ | 5221(50)... |  |
| \$2 45:16 | 86:8 | 200550:1 | $90: 14$ 537032 |  |
| 0 | $197837: 21$ | $200662: 1,5$ | 558-57002:5 |  |
| 021060ABC | 77:17 | 63:21 | 564-1932 |  |
| 1:6 3:5 | $78: 22$ $92: 19$ | 20071 : 9 | 2:10 |  |
| 07-011:5 | 108:7,17 | 8:20 12:20 | 6 |  |
| 3:5 | 198035:13 | 15:14 | 657:2 |  |
| $08104: 10$ | $199028: 17$ | 18:18 50:1 | 60601-9703 |  |
| 1 | 30:17,19 | 63:22 | 2:4 |  |
| $103: 1878$ | $76: 1680: 3$ | $2008106: 9$ | 6082 : 14 |  |
| 8:14 99:17 | 80:5,13 | 2022 :10 |  |  |
| 10:001:12 | $81: 17$ 83.13 84.8 | 20201.06:5 |  |  |
| 100 41:18 | 84:14,15 | 2190:6 | 78:13 |  |
| 1112 : 20 | 84:16 85:4 | 24 106:4,7 | $70 \mathbf{5 3} 73$ |  |
| 11:45109:15 | 85:21 86:3 | 253:13 | 700,0008:10 |  |
| $11229: 8,9$ | 86:11 | 250-ton | 73402:9 |  |
| $44: 20,21$ $84: 8$ | 94:10 | 41:19 | 7777:20 |  |
| $84: 8$ 112 (b) (6) | 95:17 96:3 | 257-4994 |  |  |
| $\begin{gathered} 112 \text { (b) (6) } \\ 44: 15 \end{gathered}$ | 96:7 | 2:14 | - 8 |  |

